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Child sponsorship is a leading form of direct aid from wealthy country
households to children in developing countries. Over 9 million chil-
dren are supported through international sponsorship organizations.
Using data from six countries, we estimate impacts on several outcomes
from sponsorship through Compassion International, a leading child
sponsorship organization. To identify program effects, we utilize an age-
eligibility rule implemented when programs began in new villages. We
find large, statistically significant impacts on years of schooling; pri-
mary, secondary, and tertiary school completion; and the probability
and quality of employment. Early evidence suggests that these impacts
are due, in part, to increases in children’s aspirations.
I. Introduction
For millions of households in wealthy countries, international child spon-
sorship represents the most intimate and direct form of involvement with
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the poor in developing countries. Sponsors typically give $25–$40 per
month to supplement an impoverished child’s education and health ex-
penses or to support programs in which the child participates. We estimate
that currently private financial flows to internationally sponsored children
exceed US$3 billion annually, yet no published research exists that has
gauged these programs’ impacts on the life outcomes of sponsored chil-
dren.
This paper examines whether children sponsored through Compas-
sion International, a leading child sponsorship organization currently
serving 1.3million children in 26 countries, have improved life outcomes
when they are adults. Data were collected on the life outcomes of 10,144
individuals over 2 years from six developing countries that are repre-
sentative of the Compassion program’s work worldwide: Bolivia, Guate-
mala, India, Kenya, the Philippines, and Uganda.
Identification of the program’s impacts rests on three eligibility rules
that Compassion used from 1980 to 1992, when those in our study were
sponsored. These rules limited the number of children per household
that could be sponsored, required sponsored children to be within walk-
ing distance of a project, and stipulated that only children below a given
age were eligible for the program. Using several estimation strategies
that harness these eligibility rules to construct counterfactuals for estimat-
ing causal effects, we find that the Compassion sponsorship program
significantly increased total years of schooling and completion rates
across all levels of schooling. Impacts are especially large for secondary
school completion, which increased by 12–18 percentage points over
an average baseline of 44.5 percent. Education impacts are particularly
strong in the two African countries. We also find positive and significant
impacts on the probability of adult employment and movement into
white-collar jobs.
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In some respects, Compassion projects are similar to many govern-
ment and international donor programs that promote education. Spon-
sors pay for children’s school tuition and uniforms, several nutritious
meals per week, health care, and tutoring. What distinguishes Compas-
sion projects from most government and international donor programs,
and from some other child sponsorship programs, is that children spend
at least 8 hours per week in an intensive after-school program that em-
phasizes their spiritual, physical, and socioemotional development. In the
sample, the average duration of sponsorship was 9.3 years, so that by the
end of their childhood, sponsored children have participated in about
4,000 hours of Compassion programming, including extra activities such
as retreats and camps. A primary objective of this extended contact is to
raise the child’s self-esteem, aspirations, and self-expectations.
Recent work in economics suggests that internal constraints that re-
flect low aspirations and reference points may lead to poverty traps ðRay
2006; Dalton, Ghosal, and Mani 2010; Bernard, Dercon, and Taffesse
2011Þ. After reporting program impacts on adult life outcomes, we pre-
sent a short summary of evidence from three follow-up studies that col-
lected data and carried out other research among 1,380 currently spon-
sored Compassion children in Bolivia, Kenya, and Indonesia. These studies
find that sponsored children exhibit significantly higher levels of self-
esteem, aspirations, and self-expectations and lower levels of hopeless-
ness. While more work is needed to establish a causal link between aspi-
rations during youth and adult life outcomes, a clearer understanding of
this relationship may have important implications for the way in which
practitioners approach development work.
Two major empirical issues must be addressed to obtain unbiased es-
timates of the impact of this type of program. First, selection of children
into a program may not be random; more needy children may have
been chosen ðas is directed in the Compassion operations manualÞ, but
it is also possible that parents chose the children who they thought were
most likely to succeed. Second, program impacts may spill over onto sib-
lings or nontreated peers in a treated village.
This study uses three program eligibility rules to address these two es-
timation issues. As Compassion established new projects from 1980 to
1992 in each of the six countries, an age-eligibility rule stipulated that
only children 12 years and younger ð11 years and under in Uganda and
GuatemalaÞ at the time the project started were eligible for sponsorship.
This arbitrary rule allows us to compare the adult life outcomes of for-
merly sponsored children relative to the life outcomes of their ineligible
older siblings, who were age 13 or older when the program was started
in their village. Moreover, to maximize the number of households bene-
fiting from sponsorships, a second rule set an upper limit on the number
of sponsored children per household; this number varied from one to
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three in the six countries. Finally, a third rule stipulated that, to be spon-
sored, a child had to reside within walking distance of the program cen-
ter, which was usually interpreted as at most a 30-minute walk. In prac-
tice, this meant that only children residing within the village where the
program was located were chosen for sponsorship. Children from neigh-
boring villages were excluded.
We use the first two rules to address the issue of endogenous child
selection. Specifically, we use a vector of dummy variables that indicate
the age of an individual when the Compassion program was introduced
into that person’s village interacted with his or her sibling order relative
to program rollout ðoldest sibling 12 or younger when the programbegan,
second-oldest sibling among those 12 or younger when the program be-
gan, etc.Þ as instruments to estimate the probability that an individual was
a sponsored child. These instruments are strongly correlated with take-
up since children meeting the age requirement were far more likely to
be sponsored, and in practice the oldest age-eligible siblings were most
likely to be sponsored. These instruments satisfy the exclusion restric-
tion for instrumental variables because as Compassion programs were
introduced in different years in different villages, the age of an individ-
ual at the time the program began in his or her village should not be
related to his or her life outcomes except via the impact of being spon-
sored.
We use the third rule to address the issue of program spillovers; we
collected data not only on sets of siblings from treated families but also
on sets of siblings from a random sample of nontreated households in
Compassion villages and from a random sample of households in neigh-
boring villages where children could not be sponsored because of the
walking distance rule. Using the identifying assumptions that program
spillovers affect neither older age-ineligible children in treated villages
nor any children in non-Compassion villages, we implement both or-
dinary least squares ðOLSÞ and instrumental variable ðIVÞ difference-
in-differences regressions that estimate direct effects on program par-
ticipants and can also be used to calculate both intrahousehold and
intravillage spillovers from the Compassion program.
These estimates yield large and statistically significant effects of child
sponsorship on education, employment, and leadership outcomes. OLS
and IV estimations, with and without the use of household fixed effects,
find that child sponsorship resulted in 1.03–1.46 additional years of com-
pleted schooling for sponsored children over a baseline of 10.24 years
for unsponsored children.1 Impacts on primary schooling range from
4.0 to 7.7 percentage points over an untreated baseline of 88.7 percent.
1 “Years of schooling” denotes highest grade attained. Grade repetition is common in
many countries, so years of schooling can exceed grade attained; we have no data on
repetition, so we cannot account for repeated grades.
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Impacts on secondary school completion are greater and highly sig-
nificant, ranging from 11.6 to 16.5 percentage points over a baseline
of 44.9 percent; accounting for marginally significant spillover effects
pushes the figure somewhat higher, to 13.7–18.5 percentage points.
Tertiary education point estimates of impact are smaller, from 2.1 to
3.6 percentage points, but these are realized over a small baseline of
4.3 percent. Child sponsorship also appears to be a great “equalizer.” Its
impacts on the educational outcomes are larger in those countries with
lower baseline education outcomes, the two African countries, while im-
pacts in Latin America and Asia are smaller, although still statistically
significant. Similarly, in countries where baseline schooling is higher for
boys, child sponsorship tends to have a bigger impact on girls; where it is
higher for girls, it has a bigger impact on boys.
OLS estimates also find positive impacts on the probability of sala-
ried employment ð5.1–6.3 percentage points, over a 35.7 percent base-
lineÞ and white-collar work ð6.5–6.7 percentage points, over a baseline of
18.7 percentÞ. There is also evidence, albeit mixed, of increases in com-
munity and church leadership.2
Our results do not necessarily apply to all child sponsorship programs.
While some of the other major child sponsorship organizations, such as
Children International, use sponsor funding for the nurturing and de-
velopment of individual children, other large programs, such as those
operated by World Vision, Plan USA, and Save the Children, use funding
given in the name of a sponsored child more broadly to create village-
level public goods.3 The less targeted nature of these programs renders
potential impacts more diffuse and thus more difficult to assess.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews
the most relevant previous studies. Section III explains the fieldwork and
data collection. Section IV describes the estimation strategy, and Sec-
tion V presents estimates of the program impacts. Section VI presents
conclusions and briefly discusses potential causal mechanisms through
the impact of the program on children’s aspirations, summarizing re-
sults from three follow-up studies of currently sponsored children.
II. Existing Research and Literature
Given the number of individuals involved in child sponsorship relation-
ships and the billions of dollars committed to them, it is surprising that
2 Results on adult life outcomes such as age of marriage, fertility, remittances, dwelling
quality, anddurable goodownership are found inour longer working paper ðWydick,Glewwe,
and Rutledge 2013Þ.
3 More recently, World Vision has begun to give priority to programs that emphasize the
personal development of children, giving less priority to funding physical infrastructure
projects.
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almost no research exists that evaluates the impacts of these programs.
One exception is the study by Kremer, Moulin, and Namunyu ð2003Þ,
whouse a randomized experiment to analyze the impacts of aDutch child
sponsorship program that funded new classroom construction and pro-
vided students a $6 uniform and $3.44 worth of textbooks. They find
that even these relatively low-cost interventions induced student ben-
eficiaries to attend school a half year longer and to advance a third of
a grade farther in formal education.
More generally, a growing literature attempts to find cost-effective ways
to induce parents to invest more in their children’s education. Research-
ers have studied many programs, including cash transfers, free meals, pro-
vision of school uniforms, deworming medicine, and free medical treat-
ment.
Perhaps the best-known and most frequently evaluated intervention
is the PROGRESA ðlater renamed OportunidadesÞ conditional cash trans-
fer ðCCTÞ program. Implemented in 1997 in poor regions of Mexico,
Oportunidades provides cash incentives for mothers to increase their chil-
dren’s school attendance and obtain health care for younger children. It
was initially implemented as a randomized trial to facilitate its evaluation
by researchers. Impact evaluations have shown that Oportunidades led
to higher school enrollment, lower grade repetition, lower dropout rates,
and higher school reentry rates among dropouts ðBehrman, Sengupta,
and Todd 2005; World Bank 2009Þ. Behrman, Parker, and Todd ð2007Þ
estimate that receiving Oportunidades cash transfers for 5.5 years in-
creased grades completed by 0.8–1.0 year. Schultz ð2004Þ estimates that
Oportunidades increased formal schooling by 0.66 year ð0.72 for girls
and 0.64 for boysÞ. He also finds that Oportunidades raised enrollment
by 3.4 percentage points, averaging over all children in grades 1–8, with
much larger impacts in later grades, not only for girls ð14.8 percentage
pointsÞ but also for boys ð6.5 percentage pointsÞ. Bobonis and Finan
ð2009Þ find that enrollment rates in Oportunidades communities in-
creased by 5 percentage points, even among those ineligible for the pro-
gram.
CCT programs have also had positive impacts on education in other
countries. For example, Barrera-Osorio et al. ð2008Þ implemented a ran-
domized experiment to evaluate the Conditional Subsidies for School At-
tendance program in Bogota, Colombia, finding that school attendance
increased by 2.8 percentage points on average.
Other programs have funded various school “inputs,” such as free or
subsidized school meals, uniforms, textbooks, school construction, and
teachers. Several focus on nutrition or health. Dre`ze and Kingdon ð2001Þ
find that providing a midday meal in India raised girls’ school attendance
by 15 percentage points. Kremer and Vermeersch ð2004Þ estimate that
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school attendance rose by 8.5 percentage points in Kenyan preschools
that provided free meals, increasing attendance of current students
and attracting new students who had never attended preschool. Handa
and Peterman ð2007Þ find that South African children’s educational at-
tainment is strongly affected by their nutritional status. Glewwe and Mi-
guel ð2008Þ review the impact of health and nutrition on education out-
comes.
Many randomized studies of education interventions have been con-
ducted in Kenya. Evans, Kremer, and Ngatia ð2008Þ evaluate a program
that selected Kenyan children by lottery to receive free school uniforms.
They find that receiving a uniform reduced absenteeism by 39 percent
and by 64 percent for poorer students. In the same area of Kenya, Miguel
and Kremer ð2004Þ implemented a randomized deworming interven-
tion. This intervention not only decreased overall disease transmission
but also reduced school absenteeism by 7 percentage points in the treat-
ment schools. They also find positive spillover effects onto children who
attended nearby schools that did not participate in the deworming
program. In a follow-up study of former participants 10 years after the
deworming experiment, Ozier ð2011Þ finds increases in cognitive per-
formance equal to 0.5–0.8 year of schooling. A randomized trial that
provided sixth-grade girls merit scholarships of about $20 for school
fees and school supplies increased student attendance by 5 percentage
points; surprisingly, it increased both girls’ and boys’ test scores ðKremer,
Miguel, and Thornton 2009Þ. Another study in Kenya provided incentives
to teachers to improve their teaching. Glewwe, Ilias, and Kremer ð2010Þ
carried out an experiment that provided valuable prizes to teachers on
the basis of their students’ test scores. Despite the incentives, teacher at-
tendance did not improve; instead teachers held additional prep ses-
sions prior to the exams on which the incentives were based, which led
to only short-term increases in test scores.
Methodologically, the empirical strategy of this paper is similar to that
of Duflo ð2001Þ in that it uses the ages of former students and geo-
graphic placement of a schooling treatment as instruments to identify
program impacts. Using a method similar to that of Pitt, Rosenzweig,
and Gibbons ð1993Þ, Duflo examines the impact of Indonesia’s rapid
expansion of school construction from 1973 to 1979. She uses an indi-
vidual’s exposure to the program, as measured by the number of schools
built in his or her region of birth, along with age at the time of program
implementation, to identify impacts on education and wages. She finds
that each new school constructed per 1,000 children led to a 0.12–0.19
increase in years of schooling. This implies an average increase of
0.25–0.40 year per child beneficiary ðabout two schools were built per
1,000 childrenÞ, which then resulted in a 3.0–5.4 percent increase in
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wages, suggesting an economic return to education of 6.8–10.6 percent.
She also finds that those who benefited most were among the poorest.
III. Counting the Sponsored, Program Background, and Fieldwork
A. Counting the Sponsored
There have been no reliable figures on the number of internationally
sponsored children worldwide; a preliminary task was to estimate this fig-
ure. Through Internet searches in multiple languages and contact with
industry personnel across countries, we tallied 207 organizations that ap-
pear to represent nearly all children sponsored through such organiza-
tions worldwide. On the basis of the sponsorship figures claimed by these
organizations, we estimate that there are currently 9.14 million interna-
tionally sponsored children in the world.4 Over 90 percent of this total
are sponsored through the 10 largest sponsorship organizations. Table 1
contains basic information about these organizations, including years of
operation, number of countries served, monthly sponsorship fees, and
number of children sponsored. All are based in the United States and
Europe, and two of the largest three are faith based, as are four of the
largest 10.
The total flow of child sponsorship funds to developing countries is
nontrivial; indeed it is similar to amounts given by the US government
for international assistance. Assuming an average monthly contribution
of $30, funding for child sponsorship is about $3.29 billion per year, ex-
cluding special gifts and travel to visit sponsored children. This is compa-
rable to US Agency for International Development budgets of $8.72 bil-
lion in 2012 for Global Health and Child Survival, $2.92 billion for
Development Assistance, and the $1.12 billion earmarked for the Millen-
nium Challenge Corporation ðOffice of Management and Budget 2012Þ.
International child sponsorship programs arose because of their use-
fulness as a marketing tool for mobilizing resources in rich countries to
reduce poverty in poor countries. As the marketers of these programs
have recognized for decades, contact with an individual child creates a
commitment device to help donors contribute a fraction of their monthly
income to alleviating child poverty in developing countries via a relation-
ship with a particular child living in poverty. In this way, international
child sponsorship programs mobilize resources by drawing on the psy-
4 Because the Internet is so vital today for fund-raising in the child sponsorship industry,
e.g., posting pictures of children and providing other contact between potential sponsors
and potentially sponsored children, we assumed that any such organization of significant
scope must have an Internet presence. This assumption is the basis for our calculation of
9.14 million sponsored children. If there are child sponsorship programs that do not use
the Internet, our 9.14 million figure would underestimate the actual number of children
sponsored worldwide.
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chological and moral instincts people possess to care for their own chil-
dren. Even in difficult economic times, the commitment of donors to
the well-being of “their child” is likely to exceed their commitment to a
large, well-intentioned—yet relatively faceless—nonprofit organization.5
Thus even apart from issues of impact and cost-effectiveness, child spon-
sorship programs may be among the most effective methods for mobiliz-
ing resources to benefit children in developing countries.
B. The Compassion Child Sponsorship Program
The world’s third-largest child sponsorship program is Compassion In-
ternational, a large, faith-based, nonprofit organization whose stated goal
is to “release children from spiritual, economic, social, and physical pov-
erty.” Compassion staffs its projects locally, and foreign employees are
rare. The projects rely on volunteers from local churches and other or-
ganizations to carry out its programming. The benefits sponsored chil-
dren receive vary somewhat by country and even within countries, and
Compassion’s approach has evolved over time. Table 2 summarizes, for
each country in this study, the benefits the sponsored children received
5 There is at least anecdotal evidence of this: During the first year of the 2008–9 reces-
sion, when giving to most US charities declined sharply, World Vision reported that the
percentage of those who maintained their monthly financial commitment to sponsored
children showed no sign of decline during that period ðKennedy 2009Þ.
TABLE 1
The 10 Leading International Child Sponsorship Programs
Organization
International
Headquarters
Year
Founded
Number of
Countries
Contribution
per Month
Sponsored
Childrena
1. World Visionb USA 1953 100 $30 4,100,000
2. Plan USA USA 1937 49 $24 1,500,000
3. Compassion
Internationalb USA 1952 26 $38 1,288,632
4. ChildFund
International USA 1938 31 $24 510,000
5. Children International USA 1980 11 $22 340,000
6. Christian Foundation
for Children
and Agingb USA 1981 23 $30 291,262
7. Kindernothilfeb Germany 1959 28 $30 145,814
8. Save the Children USA 1932 50 $28 120,000
9. SOS Children’s
Villages USA 1949 132 $28 80,000
10. Bornefonden Denmark 1972 5 $34 72,473
Othersa ð197Þ 692,979
Total 9,141,160
a Child sponsorship organizations by donating country: United States ð61Þ, United
Kingdom ð43Þ, France ð18Þ, Canada ð10Þ, Italy ð11Þ, Australia ð9Þ, Denmark ð7Þ, Spain ð7Þ,
Norway ð6Þ,Germany ð4Þ, Sweden ð4Þ, and others ð16Þ.
b Faith-based organization.
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while enrolled in the program. In Uganda and Kenya and in three of the
projects in Bolivia, Compassion operated student centers where spon-
sored children gathered on Saturday or after school on weekdays. Stu-
dents participated in structured programs at these centers, receiving ac-
ademic tutoring, spiritual instruction, health care, nutritious meals, and
school supplies. They also participated in a wide array of games and ac-
tivities. In most of the projects with student centers, Compassion children
also received school fee subsidies and school uniforms. Compassion typi-
cally sponsors children through secondary school, although a small num-
ber continue to the university level through its leadership development
program.
In Guatemala and the Philippines, Compassion programs operated
in ðProtestantÞ Christian schools, where students would receive similar
benefits, although tutoring was not generally an explicit component of
sponsorship. In India and in one project in Bolivia, Compassion collab-
orated with government programs that gave parents direct cash payments
conditional on the sponsored child’s continuation in school. However,
these programs differed from standard CCT programs in that children
received most of the benefits provided by the other Compassion pro-
grams, as well as individual nurturing and care via Compassion’s part-
nership with local Protestant churches.
All projects provided basic health care benefits. They included regular
physical examinations administered by local nurses and doctors at Com-
passion schools and student centers. Also included was a form of cata-
strophic health insurance paid through a separate fund operated by
Compassion’s headquarters in Colorado. If a Compassion child had a se-
rious illness or needed surgery, this fund covered the full cost of the pro-
cedure and hospitalization. In the rare cases in which children needed
such care, this benefit was often reported by formerly sponsored children
to be the greatest source of support offered by the program. Aside from
this catastrophic insurance, however, all funds directed to children flow
from their sponsors’ regular monthly contributions.
TABLE 2
Compassion Program Beneﬁts by Country
Country Uniforms Tutoring
School
Materials
Spiritual
Instruction
Health
Care
Gifts from
Sponsors
Cash to
Family
Uganda Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Guatemala Yes Limited Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Philippines Limited Limited Yes Yes Yes Yes No
India Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kenya Yes Yes Limited Yes Yes Yes No
Bolivia Limited Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Limited
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All children sponsored through Compassion write letters several times
per year to their sponsor, and most receive correspondence from their
sponsor ð71.8 percent in our studyÞ. In addition, about once per year
sponsors receive a picture of the child and updates from local Compas-
sion staff on the child’s progress in school. Most children ð83.7 percentÞ
also reported receiving birthday gifts from their sponsor. Sponsors can
also travel on organized trips to visit their sponsored children and their
families; while not uncommon, this was not the norm.
The survey included an open-ended question asking formerly spon-
sored children which component of the Compassion program had been
most beneficial to them. The most common answer was educational sup-
port ð38.5 percentÞ. ðWithin this category, payment of school fees and tu-
toring were cited most often, and almost equally.Þ The second-most com-
mon response was spiritual and character development ð29.4 percentÞ,
followed by economic aid ð9.5 percent—a figure that was no higher in the
two countries where parents received direct cash paymentsÞ, health care
benefits ð2.8 percentÞ, and gifts received from sponsors ð0.8 percentÞ.
In Compassion projects, selection of children for sponsorship is done
locally. Compassion instructs its staff to work with local community mem-
bers to select children using six criteria:
1. Sponsored children are to be from low-income families within walk-
ing distance of a project. The official selection criteria state, “When
only a percentage of the children are sponsored from an institution,
the school or parent committee should choose children among the
neediest families for sponsorship.”
2. Orphans, children living with a widowed parent or other family
member, and refugees are given special priority.
3. The child cannot have been sponsored by another agency.
4. Children from both Christian and non-Christian families may par-
ticipate equally, but all families must allow their children to partici-
pate in the program’s Christian religious instruction.
5. Compassion sponsors a maximum of three children per family.
Some countries set a lower limit ðone or two per familyÞ.
6. Children older than 12 years cannot be sponsored. Children in kin-
dergarten and in first, second, or third grade receive top priority;
older children ðstill age 12 or underÞ receive lower priority.
The last guideline was intended to lengthen the number of years that
a child can be sponsored and was fully operational after programs had
operated for several years. However, when a program was first introduced
into a village, parents tended to select older eligible children rather than
younger eligible children. The mean length of sponsorship in our data is
9.3 years.
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C. Survey and Fieldwork
The survey work in the six countries of our main study took place from
June 2008 to August 2010. Table 3 shows, for each country, a list of vil-
lages, rollout years for each village, sample sizes, and survey dates. Some
projects started on a large scale, enrolling up to 100 children in the first
year. Others started with fewer children, enrolling only 20–30 in the first
year. For the larger projects, individuals were randomly selected to be
surveyed from the first 2 or 3 years of enrollment lists. For smaller proj-
ects, data were collected from all children who were enrolled in the first
2 or 3 years. To avoid attrition bias, the sample includes both children
who were sponsored for many years and children who dropped out rel-
atively early.
In some cases the enrollment lists from which we sampled formerly
sponsored children were in an electronic database at the country office.
In others the only lists were hard copies of computer printouts kept on
file at the project sites, which were found after extensive searches of file
cabinets or basement boxes. Two of the 19 projects no longer sponsored
children through Compassion.
TABLE 3
Survey Information by Country
Country
Treatment Villages
and Cities
Nontreatment
Villages and Cities
Sample
Size
Time of
Survey
Uganda Jinja ð1980Þ,a Bugiri
ð1981Þ, Masaka ð1989Þ
Kakooge, Bombo 809 June–August
2008
Guatemala San Pedro La Laguna
ð1991Þ, San Juan La
Laguna ð1992Þ, San
Pedro Necta ð1992Þ
San Pablo La Laguna,
Santiago
Chimaltenango
1,762 May–July
2009
Philippines Quezon City ð1986Þ,
Bacolod ð1986Þ
Skybag, Handumanan 1,428 November
2009–
February
2010
India Tuticorn ð1980Þ,
Sawyerpuram ð1980Þ,
Bangalore ð1986Þ
Eral, Bangalore 1,622 March–April
2010
Kenya Cianthia ð1986Þ, Cierria
ð1986Þ, Nderu ð1990Þ,
Thigio ð1990Þ
Riakingenyi, Kerwa,
Rusigeti
3,056 April–June
2010
Bolivia Chulla ð1992Þ, Los Olivios
ð1990Þ, Puntiti ð1991Þ,
Pongonhuyo ð1980Þ
Pairumani-Iscaypata,
Igrana
1,467 June–August
2010
Six countries 19 Compassion programs 13 nontreatment areas 10,144 June 2008–
August
2010
a Year the program began.
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Local assistants were hired to locate the households of formerly spon-
sored individuals who were on the early enrollment lists. They were usu-
ally recommended by project staff and were known to be responsible,
well-respected community members. They also had been raised in the
village and so were knowledgeable about the community, but we es-
chewed hiring enumerators with formal connections with Compassion
to avoid bias in responses. We located close to 99 percent of the targeted
households in Uganda, Guatemala, and Kenya and about 90 percent in
India and Bolivia. In the Philippines slightly less than 80 percent were
located because of a high rate of household mobility following sponsor-
ship. Overall, we located 93.5 percent of the families of the formerly spon-
sored children who were on the enrollment lists for the first 2–3 years
the program operated in each village. Families who were not located had
key family members who had passed away or had migrated to unknown
areas of the country or to known areas but without specific details re-
garding their location.
In addition to these Compassion households, we surveyed 50–75 non-
Compassion households in each Compassion village, conditional on the
presence of an individual in the household being born in the 10 years
before the Compassion project began operation. We also randomly sam-
pled a similar number of households in neighboring villages without
a Compassion program that were similar to the nearby Compassion vil-
lages. Households that did not participate in the program, from either
Compassion or non-Compassion villages, were surveyed in order to check
for intrahousehold and intravillage spillovers, as explained below in Sec-
tion IV. The overall, six-country data set includes information on 1,860
formerly sponsored children, 3,704 of their unsponsored siblings, 2,136
individuals from nonparticipating families in villages where the Compas-
sion program operated, and 2,444 individuals from similar, nearby vil-
lages without the Compassion program.
The samples of non-Compassion households, from both the Compas-
sion and the non-Compassion villages, were randomly selected as fol-
lows. A starting point in the village was randomly chosen, and then every
third household on the street was selected for possible inclusion in the
survey. The household was briefly questioned to see whether any of its
members met the sponsorship age criteria. When the end of the street
or block was reached, the enumerator turned left and continued with ev-
ery second or third household, then turned right and proceeded in this
way, choosing new random points in the village on different days.
Table 4 shows summary statistics for the outcome variables and key
control variables. The survey questionnaire we used had questions to col-
lect basic information on adult life outcomes of both sponsored chil-
dren and their siblings, as well as children in nonparticipating house-
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holds. These included questions on an individual’s level of schooling,
type of employment, and whether he or she held various leadership
positions. The questionnaire was designed to ask each question sequen-
tially across all siblings by age to avoid focusing on the siblingðsÞ who
had been sponsored by Compassion. The questions were designed to be
easily answered in order to obtain data on the basic life outcomes of
adults that would be common knowledge among family members. We
eschewed questions that asked for detailed data or for exact values of
continuous variables since family members may not be able to provide
such information. Many of the questions were obtained from the edu-
cation modules in the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement
Study surveys.
We interviewed all available family members jointly regarding the
life outcomes of each formerly sponsored child and his or her siblings.
Although, in most cases, several family members answered questions
TABLE 4
Summary Statistics
Uganda Guatemala Philippines India Kenya Bolivia
All Six
Countries
Sponsored as a
child .232 .213 .168 .138 .178 .198 .183
ð.423Þ ð.409Þ ð.374Þ ð.345Þ ð.383Þ ð.398Þ ð.387Þ
Years sponsored 11.325 6.717 7.469 11.065 10.207 9.510 9.287
ð3.067Þ ð2.467Þ ð4.629Þ ð3.230Þ ð3.332Þ ð3.747Þ ð3.790Þ
Total years of
education 9.185 8.859 12.180 11.696 10.442 10.750 10.566
ð4.003Þ ð4.295Þ ð1.994Þ ð3.345Þ ð3.078Þ ð4.155Þ ð3.654Þ
Completed
primary .841 .795 .994 .937 .953 .847 .905
ð.366Þ ð.404Þ ð.080Þ ð.244Þ ð.211Þ ð.360Þ ð.293Þ
Completed
secondary .269 .486 .745 .602 .338 .537 .485
ð.444Þ ð.500Þ ð.436Þ ð.490Þ ð.473Þ ð.499Þ ð.500Þ
Completed tertiary .077 .022 .019 .047 .040 .117 .049
ð.266Þ ð.148Þ ð.135Þ ð.212Þ ð.195Þ ð.321Þ ð.216Þ
Age 28.968 26.635 29.054 32.575 30.806 29.113 29.827
ð8.642Þ ð6.468Þ ð8.751Þ ð8.813Þ ð7.919Þ ð7.893Þ ð8.232Þ
Gender ðfemaleÞ .476 .511 .502 .500 .515 .501 .505
ð.500Þ ð.500Þ ð.500Þ ð.500Þ ð.500Þ ð.500Þ ð.500Þ
Number of
siblings 4.580 4.838 4.389 3.991 6.307 4.908 5.076
ð2.339Þ ð2.195Þ ð2.089Þ ð1.944Þ ð2.237Þ ð2.003Þ ð2.308Þ
Mother’s
education 5.385 2.105 9.682 6.982 3.862 2.783 4.853
ð3.778Þ ð2.909Þ ð3.120Þ ð3.645Þ ð4.116Þ ð3.059Þ ð4.338Þ
Father’s
education 7.024 3.496 10.032 7.629 5.538 4.727 6.166
ð4.044Þ ð3.645Þ ð3.203Þ ð3.635Þ ð4.318Þ ð3.381Þ ð4.310Þ
Note.—Entries are means; standard deviations are in parentheses.
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on sibling life outcomes, most of the information was collected from the
principal respondent. Themost commonprincipal respondents were the
parents of the sponsored child ð36.6 percentÞ and the formerly sponsored
child ð35.8 percentÞ, followed by siblings ð22.4 percentÞ and other rel-
atives ð5.2 percentÞ.
IV. Empirical Methodology
We employ a variety of estimation techniques to identify the impact of
theCompassion sponsorshipprogram. Important to each approach is the
program’s 12 years and under eligibility rule. Figure 1 shows the proba-
bility that a child in a treated household was sponsored as a function of
his or her age at the Compassion program introduction ðACIÞ into his
or her village. On average over the bars in the figure, a child in a treated
household who was between 0 and 12 years old when the program came
to his or her village had a .458 probability of sponsorship; for a child who
was 12–18, the probability was only .022. ðA few 13-year-old children were
sponsored because their photos had been taken and posted for sponsor-
ship when of eligible age but a sponsor was not found until they were 13.Þ
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate differences between treated and nontreated
households in years of completed schooling and the probability of com-
pleting secondary school, respectively, as a function of 2-year ACI cate-
gories ðfor visual smoothnessÞ. Both figures compare treated households
to nontreated households in Compassion villages. In figure 2, for treated
FIG. 1.—Discontinuity in sponsorship by age at time of program introduction. Mean:
ACI ≤ 12, 0.458; ACI > 12, 0.022; difference: 0.436.
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FIG. 2.—Total years of formal schooling by age when the Compassion program was
introduced into a village ðACIÞ. Means: Compassion households: ACI ≤ 12, 11.53; ACI > 12,
10.08; non-Compassion households: ACI ≤ 12, 10.75; ACI > 12, 9.88; difference in differ-
ences: 0.58.
FIG. 3.—Secondary school completion by age when the Compassion program was in-
troduced into a village ðACIÞ. Means: Compassion households: ACI ≤ 12, 0.57; ACI > 12,
0.39; non-Compassion households: ACI ≤ 12, 0.54; ACI > 12, 0.45; difference in differences:
0.090.
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households the difference between the average outcome for those with
ACI ≤ 12 and the average for those with ACI ≥ 13 is 1.47 years of school-
ing. For nontreated households the difference is 0.89, so the difference
indifferences equals 0.58 year.Dividing this figure by thedifference in the
probability of sponsorship across these two ACI categories ð0.436Þ sug-
gests a 1.33-year impact of being sponsored, not accounting for controls.
The analogous difference in differences in figure 3 for secondary school
completion is 9.0 percentage points; dividing this by 0.436 suggests that
sponsorship increases secondary completion by 20.6 percentage points,
which could include spillovers onto other eligible children in Compas-
sion households, but likewise does not adjust for control variables.
To estimate the impact of the program in a manner that more care-
fully controls for individual and household characteristics, we employ
four regression specifications: ordinary least squares ðOLSÞ, a general-
ized method of moments instrumental variables estimator ðIV-GMMÞ,
and both of these techniques adding household fixed effects ðOLS-FE
and IV-GMM-FEÞ. These estimation methods must address three con-
cerns to identify the impact of the Compassion program: ð1Þ endogeneity
in the selection of households into the program, ð2Þ endogeneity in the
selection of children within a particular household into the program,
and ð3Þ spillover effects from the program onto nontreated individuals
in both Compassion and non-Compassion households in Compassion
villages.
To address the first concern, our estimation strategy ðaÞ allows for an
additive, unobserved difference between selected and nonselected house-
holds in Compassion villages and an additive, unobserved difference
between households in villages with and without the Compassion pro-
gram; ðbÞ controls for individual and parental characteristics; and ðcÞ al-
lows for unobserved household fixed effects ðfor two of the four regres-
sion specificationsÞ.
The second concern is the possibility of endogenous child selection
within families. In practice, Compassion staff often select families for
sponsorship, after which the families strongly influence which of their
children are sponsored. Endogeneity in the choice of children within a
family could bias estimates in either direction; selected children may
have been chosen because they seemed of higher ability and so could
realize larger gains from the program. Conversely, parents who have pref-
erences for equal outcomes across all their children would select chil-
dren whom they deem to bemore in need of assistance than their siblings.
It appeared to us in the field that the latter was more common, which is
consistent with Compassion’s guidelines for field personnel.
We address possible endogeneity in child selection by constructing in-
strumental variables on the basis of an individual’s age and sibling order
relative to the year of program rollout in his or her village ðthe former
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are ACI categories; the latter are oldest age-eligible child, second-oldest
age-eligible child, etc.Þ. These variables should not be related to adult life
outcomes except through program participation, and they are highly
correlated with the probability of sponsorship; thus they are valid instru-
ments to address endogenous child selection. We observed that needier
children tended to be selected for sponsorship from among age-eligible
siblings, so we expect any bias in OLS estimates to be downward. Thus a
priori we expect IV estimates to be larger than OLS estimates.
To address the third concern, spillover effects, each estimationmethod
incorporates a difference-in-differences estimation strategy that allows
for measurement of potential spillover effects onto nonsponsored in-
dividuals in both Compassion households and non-Compassion house-
holds in Compassion villages. Estimation of potential spillover effects
rests on two identifying assumptions. The first is that spillovers do not
flow from Compassion villages to non-Compassion villages. The second
is that spillovers do not trickle from sponsored younger children up to
older age-ineligible children in any households in Compassion villages.
While there is little reason to expect violations of the first assumption
due to the distance between neighboring communities in our study, one
objection to the second assumption is the possibility that sponsorship of
younger age-eligible children affects their older age-ineligible siblings.
Yet while there are good reasons to expect positive externalities to trickle
down from sponsored children to younger unsponsored siblings, there is
also good reason to expect that spillovers onto older age-ineligible sib-
lings are much smaller, if not zero. Older siblings tend to be less influ-
enced by their younger siblings’ choices than vice versa. More important,
education opportunities are usually accessible only within a relevant age
range, beyond which older siblings have often passed, preventing them
from emulating their younger siblings even if they wanted to do so.
Tomeasure spillover effects onto nonsponsored age-eligible siblings in
treated ðCompassionÞ households, we compare differences in life out-
comes between age-eligible children and their older age-ineligible sib-
lings in Compassion households with the same differences between these
two groups in nearby, nontreated villages. To estimate spillover effects
fromCompassion onto non-Compassion households in program villages,
we compare differences in life outcomes between age-eligible siblings
and their older age-ineligible siblings in nontreated households in Com-
passion villages with the same differences between these two groups in
nearby non-Compassion villages. This is done by including dummy vari-
ables in the regression analysis that represent each of these groups.
More formally, we assign all individuals who were 16 or younger when
the Compassion program began in their villages ðor a neighboring vil-
lageÞ to seven mutually exclusive categories:
410 journal of political economy
This content downloaded from 138.202.189.84 on Wed, 3 Dec 2014 16:21:43 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1. sponsored children, denoted by T 5 1, who were 12 or younger
when the program started in their villages;
2. siblings of program participants who were 12 or younger when the
program was introduced into their villages ðdenoted by D ≤121 5 1Þ;
they were eligible, but not selected, for the program;
3. siblings of program participants who were 13–16 when the pro-
gram was introduced into their villages and thus were ineligible
for the program ðD13–161 5 1Þ;
4. individuals innon-Compassionhouseholds inprogramvillageswho
were 12 or younger when the program was introduced ðD ≤122 5 1Þ;
5. individuals in non-Compassion households in program villages
who were 13–16 when the program was introduced ðD13–162 5 1Þ;
6. individuals in non-Compassion villages who were 12 or younger
when the program was introduced in a neighboring village ðD ≤123
5 1Þ; and, finally,
7. individuals in non-Compassion villages who were 13–16 when the
program was introduced in a neighboring village ðD13–163 5 1Þ.6
These categories, and the associated notation, lead to the following
regression equation:
yi 5 a1D ≤121i 1 a2D
13–16
1i 1 tðD ≤121i  TiÞ1 b1D ≤122i 1 b2D13–162i
1 g1D
≤12
3i 1 g2D
13–16
3i 1 dCh 1 vCv 1 X if1 ei ;
ð1Þ
where yi is the adult outcome of interest for person i, Ch is a dummy
variable indicating a household with a sponsored child, Cv is a dummy
variable indicating residence in a village with the Compassion program,
and X i is a vector of controls that include gender, age, age squared, birth
order, number of siblings in a family, and mother’s and father’s educa-
tion.7
This framework allows us to estimate the causal impacts of the Com-
passion program under different assumptions about spillover effects. If
we assume that ðiÞ differences between villages with and without the
6 Individuals 17 or older in program households are accounted for by the sum of the
program household dummy variable and the program village dummy variable in eq. ð1Þ,
and individuals 17 or older in program villages are accounted for by the program village
dummy variable. Individuals 17 or older in nonprogram villages are the omitted category.
Note also that D≤121 5 1 for both sponsored children and their age-eligible siblings who were
not chosen to be sponsored.
7 A more flexible specification would allow t to vary for each ACI category ðACI 5 12,
ACI 5 11, etc.Þ, and similarly for a1, a2, b1, b2, g1, and g2. We tested the restrictions in
eq. ð1Þ that t is the same for all sponsored children ði.e., does not vary by ACIÞ and the
analogous restrictions for a1, a2, b1, b2, g1, and g2 and the same restrictions in eq. ð3Þ
below, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that these restrictions hold. Unrestricted esti-
mates, as well as the tests of these restrictions, are available from the authors on request.
international child sponsorship 411
This content downloaded from 138.202.189.84 on Wed, 3 Dec 2014 16:21:43 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Compassion program can be fully represented by vCv and the observed
covariates X; ðiiÞ differences between participating and nonparticipating
households in villages where Compassion has a program can be repre-
sented by dCh and the observed covariates X; ðiiiÞ there are no intra-
family, intravillage, and intervillage spillover effects; and ðivÞ intrafamily
child selection is random, then OLS estimates of equation ð1Þ would con-
sistently estimate t, the impact of the sponsorship program on yi . More-
over, we can test whether these assumptions are reasonable. For exam-
ple, continuing to assume no spillovers onto individuals with ACI ≥ 13,
assumptions i and ii imply that a2 5 b2 5 g2 ðCh, Cv, and the observed
covariates X fully account for differences between individuals with ACI
of 13–16 in Compassion households, non-Compassion households
in Compassion villages, and households in non-Compassion villages, so
there is no need for these three parameters to differÞ, and adding assump-
tion iii implies that a15 b15g1 ðwithout intrahousehold or intravillage
spillovers, there is also no reason for these three parameters to differÞ.
Alternatively, if assumptions i and ii hold but assumption iii does not,
intrahousehold spillovers onto nontreated eligible siblings can be esti-
mated as explained above by the difference in differences, ða1 2 a2Þ2
ðg1 2 g2Þ, and intravillage spillovers among children 12 and younger
can be estimated by ðb1 2 b2Þ2 ðg12 g2Þ. If spillovers exist, then the full
treatment effect is no longer estimated by t alone. If there are intra-
household spillovers, the full program effect on the treated can be esti-
mated by t1 ða1 2 a2Þ2 ðg1 2 g2Þ. That is, t estimates the impact of the
program on a treated child relative to his or her siblings of similar age;
but since those siblings experienced spillover effects, one needs to add
this spillover effect to t to obtain the full program impact on the treated
child.
Our IV estimations use a vector of instruments comprising interac-
tions between dummy variables for a child’s age at program introduc-
tion ðACIÞ and dummy variables for sibling order relative to program roll-
out ðSORRÞ.8 These dummy variables have strong predictive power for
the childðrenÞ chosen by parents for the program because of parents’
tendency to choose the oldest age-eligible siblings for sponsorship.9
Moreover, they plausibly satisfy the exclusion restriction for equation ð1Þ
since there is no reason why, after controlling for characteristic variables
ðXÞ, a child’s age at the time of program rollout interacted with SORR
8 SORR consists of three dummy variables: oldest sibling among age-eligible siblings
at time of program rollout, second oldest of such siblings at time of program rollout, and
third or higher oldest of such siblings at time of program rollout.
9 Among children in Compassion households, the probability of the two oldest age-
eligible children being sponsored was 51.5 percent ðaverage over all six countriesÞ, com-
pared to only 20.4 percent for all other age-eligible children.
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should affect adult life outcomes except via its effect on the probability
of sponsorship.
In addition to aggregating age categories ð12 or less and 13–16Þ, we
also aggregated our instrumental variables.10 This is done to avoid po-
tential problems due to including large numbers of instruments that
individually may be weak and to provide more reliable asymptotic results
given that the sample is divided into only 32 clusters ðvillagesÞ. We main-
tained the distinction between children who were the oldest eligible sib-
ling, the second-oldest eligible sibling, and all other eligible siblings, but
we grouped individuals by ACI into three categories: 5 or younger, 6–8,
and 9–12, yielding nine instruments of the form Z ACI1i 5 ðD ACI1i  SORRÞ.
Other variations in the age aggregation of the instruments yield very
similar results.
Thus for IV estimates the first-stage estimation is
Ti 5 ~a1D ≤121i 1 ~a 2D
13–16
1i 1
~b1D
≤12
2i 1
~b2D
13–16
2i 1 ~g1D
≤12
3i 1 ~g2 D
13–16
3i
1 ~dCh 1 ~vCv 1 Xi ~J1 ZACI1i ~p1 ei
ð2Þ
and the second stage is
yi 5 a1D ≤121i 1 a2D
13–16
1i 1 tðD ≤121i T^i Þ1 b1D ≤122i 1 b2D13–162i 1 g1D ≤123i
1 g2 D
13–16
3i 1 dCh 1 vCv e1 X iJ1 ei;
ð20Þ
where T^ ij is the predicted probability of being sponsored. Equations ð2Þ
and ð20Þ are estimated using GMM, which is more efficient than stan-
dard IV estimates and allows one to carry out J -tests of overidentifying
restrictions to check the validity of the instruments.
We also present OLS and ðGMMÞ IV household fixed-effect estimates,
which controlmore directly for interhousehold unobservables that could
affect child selection. The main disadvantage is that the large number of
fixed effects may reduce the precision of the estimates. The OLS-FE es-
timate for child i in household j is
yij 5 a1D ≤121ij 1 a2D
13–16
1ij 1 tðD ≤121ij  TiÞ1 b1D ≤122ij 1 b2D13–162ij
1 g1D
≤12
3ij 1 g2D
13–16
3ij 1 X ijJ1 vj 1 eij ;
ð3Þ
where vj is a household fixed effect and other variables are as defined
previously. For IV-GMM-FE, the first-stage equations are given by
10 Results are similar when we retain all 54 instrumental variables.
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Tij 5 ~a1D ≤121ij 1 ~a2D
13–16
1ij 1
~b1D ≤122ij 1 ~b2D
13–16
2ij 1 ~g1D
≤12
3ij
1 ~g2D 13–163iij 1 X ij ~J 1 Z
ACI
ij ~p 1
~vj 1 ~eit ;
ð4Þ
where ~vj is also a household fixed effect, and ZACIij is the same vector of
instruments used in equation ð3Þ. The second-stage equation of the house-
hold fixed-effects estimation is
yij 5 a1D ≤121ij 1 a2D
13–16
1ij 1 tðD ≤121ij T^ iÞ1 b1D ≤122ij 1 b2D 13–162ij
1 g1D
≤12
3ij 1 g2D
13–16
3ij 1 vj 1 X ijJ1 eij :
ð40Þ
V. Empirical Results
This section presents estimates of the impact of child sponsorship on
completed years of schooling and on the probabilities of completing pri-
mary, secondary, and tertiary education. It also summarizes estimates of
impacts on employment and leadership and presents robustness checks.
A. Estimates of Impact on Education
Table 4 provides, by country, descriptive statistics of theoutcome variables
and the main control variables. Table 5 shows how the outcome variables
differ between all sponsored children ðcol. 1Þ, all nonsponsored children
in the sample ðcols. 2 and 3Þ, and nonsponsored siblings of sponsored
children ðcols. 4 and 5Þ. Simple t-tests in table 5 that do not account for
the influence of control variables show statistically significant differences
in all these adult life outcomes, including formal years of schooling,
where sponsored children realize 1.38more years of schooling than their
unsponsored siblings and 1.79 more years of schooling than their un-
sponsored peers.
Tables 6–9 provide estimates of equations ð1Þ, ð20Þ, ð3Þ, and ð40Þ, that is,
estimates basedonOLS, IV-GMM,OLSwithhousehold-level fixed effects,
and IV-GMMwith household-level fixed effects. The education outcomes
differ for each table; years of completed schooling are in table 6, and
primary, secondary, and university completion are in tables 7, 8, and 9,
respectively. OLS estimates of the impact of Compassion sponsorship on
completed years of formal schooling in column 1 of table 6 show a highly
significant estimated direct impact ðtÞ of a little over 1 year ð1.03 yearsÞ.
The coefficients on the other categories of individuals in the next six
rows of the table measure differences in educational outcomes between
those individuals and individuals in the same type of household who
were 17 or older when the Compassion program was introduced in their
village ðor a nearby villageÞ. For example, the second ðthirdÞ row sug-
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gests that children who were 12 and younger ð13–16Þ in Compassion
households when the program was introduced but did not participate
in the program eventually attained about 0.42 ð0.17Þ more year of
schooling than their siblings who were 17 or older when the program
began, but neither difference is statistically significant. Similarly, rows 4
and 5 compare younger household members to those aged 17 and older
in non-Compassion households in Compassion villages, and rows 6 and 7
do the same among those in non-Compassion villages. The assumption
that the general specification used in equations ð1Þ–ð4Þ is reasonable—
more specifically, thatCh, Cv, and the observed covariates in X adequately
account for differences between individuals with ACI of 13–16 across
Compassion households, non-Compassion households in Compassion
villages, and households in non-Compassion villages, which implies that
a2 5 b2 5 g2—is tested in the eighth row of table 6 and is not rejected.
The results in table 6 also allow one to test for spillover effects, as
explained in Section IV. The first check for possible spillovers is to test
the assumption of “parallel trends” among nonsponsored students with
ACI ≤ 12 in the three types of households, which implies a1 5 b1 5 g1;
this is not rejected ðninth rowÞ. The tenth row of table 6 directly checks
for intrahousehold spillovers by comparing the difference in years of
schooling between nonparticipating individuals with ACI 12 or below
TABLE 5
Summary Means and t-Tests of Education Variables
Mean, Sponsored
Individuals
ð1Þ
Mean, All
Nonsponsored
Individuals
ð2Þ
Difference
t -Test
ð3Þ
Mean,
Nonsponsored
Siblings in
Sponsored
Households
ð4Þ
Difference
t -Test
ð5Þ
Total years of
education 12.03 10.24 1.79*** 10.65 1.38***
ð2.79Þ ð3.74Þ ð.093Þ ð3.41Þ ð.092Þ
Completed
primary .984 .887 .096*** .927 .057***
ð.127Þ ð.316Þ ð.0075Þ ð.260Þ ð.0064Þ
Completed
secondary .646 .449 .196*** .460 .185***
ð.478Þ ð.497Þ ð.013Þ ð.498Þ ð.014Þ
Completed
university .078 .043 .035*** .049 .029***
ð.268Þ ð.203Þ ð.0056Þ ð.216Þ ð.007Þ
Note.—In cols.1, 2, and 4, numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. In cols. 3
and 5, numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Full sample size is 10,011. Number of
formerly sponsored individuals is 1,834. Number of individuals in nontreated households
is 4,560. Number of nonsponsored individuals in treated households is 3,617.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
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and those with ACI 13–16 in Compassion households with the same dif-
ference for individuals in nearby non-Compassion villages. The insignifi-
cance of this double difference, ða1 2 a2Þ2 ðg1 2 g2Þ, yields no evidence
for intrahousehold spillovers from sponsored children to age-eligible
nonsponsored siblings in Compassion households. The eleventh row tests
TABLE 6
OLS and IV Estimates of Equations ð1Þ, ð20Þ, ð3Þ, and ð40Þ: Years of Schooling
Variable
OLS
ð1Þ
IV-GMM
ð2Þ
OLS-FE
ð3Þ
IV-GMM-FE
ð4Þ
Program participant ðtÞ 1.034*** 1.383*** 1.118*** 1.455***
ð.152Þ ð.441Þ ð.121Þ ð.407Þ
Compassion household:
ACI ≤ 12 ða1Þ .421 2.069 .720 .765
ð.555Þ ð.330Þ ð.432Þ ð.475Þ
ACI 13–16 ða2Þ .169 2.236 .039 .082
ð.417Þ ð.251Þ ð.265Þ ð.207Þ
Program village:
ACI ≤ 12 ðb1Þ .588 .476 .897** .916
ð.611Þ ð.437Þ ð.436Þ ð.579Þ
ACI 13–16 ðb2Þ 2.013 2.205 .414 .405
ð.533Þ ð.430Þ ð.459Þ ð.468Þ
Nonprogram village:
ACI ≤ 12 ðg1Þ .690 .248 2.085 .047
ð.734Þ ð.697Þ ð.504Þ ð.435Þ
ACI 13–16 ðg2Þ .161 .041 2.525** 2.499***
ð.523Þ ð.486Þ ð.197Þ ð.185Þ
F-tests/x2 tests of parallel trends:
a2 5 b2 5 g2 .08 .26 2.26 6.08**
½.926 ½.877 ½.121 ½.048
a1 5 b1 5 g1 .07 1.54 1.03 1.38
½.935 ½.464 ½.368 ½.501
Intrahousehold spillovers:
ða1 2 a2Þ 2 ðg1 2 g2Þ 2.277 2.039 .240 .137
ð.686Þ ð.686Þ ð.516Þ ð.555Þ
Intravillage spillovers:
ðb1 2 b2Þ 2 ðg1 2 g2Þ .072 .474 .043 2.036
ð.631Þ ð.584Þ ð.540Þ ð.529Þ
Program impact including
intrahousehold spillovers:
t 1 ða1 2 a2Þ 2 ðg1 2 g2Þ .757 1.344* 1.359** 1.592***
ð.678Þ ð.713Þ ð.506Þ ð.446Þ
Hausman test ½p -value . . . ½.969 . . . ½.922
Overidentification ð J -testÞ ½p -value . . . 9.30 . . . 6.05
½.232 ½.534
Weak IV test ðF-statisticÞ . . . 60.03 . . . 48.93
Observations 9,954 9,954 9,954 9,954
R2 .253 .250 .064 .047
Note.—Clustered standard errors at the village level are in parentheses. Each regression
includes controls for age at program introduction ðACIÞ at age 12 and below and at ages
13–16, age, age squared, birth order, gender, status as oldest child, mother’s education, fa-
ther’s education, mother’s education missing, and father’s education missing.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
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for spillovers within villages by comparing the difference between individ-
uals with ACI 12 or below and those with ACI 13–16 in non-Compassion
households in Compassion villages with the same difference in non-
Compassion villages, ðb1 2 b2Þ2 ðg1 2 g2Þ. Thus there is no evidence of
intravillage spillovers from Compassion households onto age-eligible chil-
dren in non-Compassion households in Compassion villages.
The impact on program participants that includes possible spillover
effects, t1 ða1 2 a2Þ2 ðg1 2 g2Þ, is in the twelfth row of table 6. This
“full” program impact is somewhat smaller than the direct program im-
pact ð0.76 vs. 1.03Þ and is statistically insignificant. Yet the lack of statisti-
cal significance is due to adding the four statistically insignificant param-
eters that attempt to capture spillovers to the estimate of the direct impact.
Because the spillover estimates are insignificant, our preferred estimate of
the Compassion program’s impact on years of schooling is the direct im-
pact ðtÞ, which is 1.03.
Column 2 of table 6 presents IV estimates of the impact of the Com-
passion program on years of schooling, which are somewhat higher ðdi-
rect impact of 1.38 yearsÞ. Note that the exclusion restrictions are not
rejected by the overidentification test ðp -value 5 .232Þ, and the F -test of
the explanatory power of the excluded instruments is quite large ð60.03Þ.
However, the Hausman test does not reject the hypothesis that the OLS
and IV estimates are equal ðp -value 5 .969Þ. As with the OLS estimates,
there is no evidence of intrahousehold or intravillage spillovers, and
the “full” program effect on participants ð1.34 yearsÞ is very similar to
the direct effect ð1.38Þ, though it is significant only at the 10 percent
level because of the imprecision of the estimated spillover effects.
Columns 3 and 4 carry out the same estimates in columns 1 and 2 but
add household fixed effects. Estimates of direct impacts ðtÞ are slightly
higher, at 1.12 and 1.46 years. Although the program effect including
spillovers, t1 ða1 2 a2Þ2 ðg1 2 g2Þ, is estimated to be somewhat higher
ð1.36 and 1.59 years, respectivelyÞ, there is no significant evidence of
spillovers, so the estimates of the direct impacts in table 6 are our pre-
ferred measures of impact.11
Estimation results for primary school completion are shown in table 7.
The estimates of the direct impact ðtÞ are generally significant but small,
probably because of the relatively high rate of baseline primary school
completion in these villages ð88.7 percentÞ. These estimates are similar
across columns, ranging from 4.0 ðOLS estimatesÞ to 7.7 percentage
points ðIV estimates without fixed effectsÞ. All except the fixed-effect IV
estimate in column 4 are significant at the 1 percent level. There is no
11 There is marginally significant evidence that the parallel trends assumption is violated
in the IV-GMM-FE specification ðp -value5 .048Þ, but since the seven other tests of parallel
trends in table 6 do not reject that assumption and the Hausman test does not indicate a
need for IV estimation, we do not view this as a major cause for concern.
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TABLE 7
OLS and IV Estimates of Equations ð1Þ, ð20Þ, ð3Þ, and ð40Þ:
Primary School Completion
Variable
OLS
ð1Þ
IV-GMM
ð2Þ
OLS-FE
ð3Þ
IV-GMM-FE
ð4Þ
Program participant ðtÞ .0404*** .0771*** .0493*** .0503
ð.0086Þ ð.0282Þ ð.0097Þ ð.0453Þ
Compassion household:
ACI ≤ 12 ða1Þ .0171 2.0133 .0199 .0358
ð.0540Þ ð.0288Þ ð.0382Þ ð.0284Þ
ACI 13–16 ða2Þ .0042 2.0243 2.0062 .0069
ð.0437Þ ð.0303Þ ð.0261Þ ð.0175Þ
Program village:
ACI ≤ 12 ðb1Þ .0367 .0062 .0657** .0468
ð.0574Þ ð.0493Þ ð.0311Þ ð.0374Þ
ACI 13–16 ðb2Þ 2.0217 2.0507 .0205 .0119
ð.0480Þ ð.0402Þ ð.0312Þ ð.0337Þ
Nonprogram village:
ACI ≤ 12 ðg1Þ .0658 2.0079 .0133 2.0058
ð.0773Þ ð.0714Þ ð.0493Þ ð.0448Þ
ACI 13–16 ðg2Þ .0019 .0157 2.0288 2.0355*
ð.0550Þ ð.0479Þ ð.0211Þ ð.0194Þ
F-tests/x2 tests of parallel
trends:
a2 5 b2 5 g2 .16 1.20 .98 3.20
½.856 ½.548 ½.388 ½.202
a1 5 b1 5 g1 .17 .22 .74 .72
½.846 ½.894 ½.487 ½.698
Intrahousehold spillovers:
ða1 2 a2Þ 2 ðg1 2 g2Þ 2.0511 .0347 2.0160 2.0007
ð.0719Þ ð.0708Þ ð.0534Þ ð.0532Þ
Intravillage spillovers:
ðb1 2 b2Þ 2 ðg1 2 g2Þ 2.0056 .0805 .0030 .0053
ð.0693Þ ð.0666Þ ð.0568Þ ð.0451Þ
Program impact including
intrahousehold spillovers:
t 1 ða1 2 a2Þ 2 ðg1 2 g2Þ 2.0106 .1118 .0332 .0495
ð.0726Þ ð.0745Þ ð.0530Þ ð.0429Þ
Hausman test ½ p -value . . . ½.888 . . . ½.830
Overidentification ð J -testÞ
½ p -value . . . 9.47 . . . 8.23
½.220 ½.313
Weak IV test ðF-statisticÞ . . . 60.03 . . . 48.93
Observations 9,954 9,954 9,954 9,954
R 2 .123 .104 .031 .030
Note.—Clustered standard errors at the village level are in parentheses. Each regression
includes controls for age at program introduction ðACIÞ at age 12 and below and at ages
13–16, age, age squared, birth order, gender, status as oldest child, mother’s education, fa-
ther’s education, mother’s education missing, and father’s education missing.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
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evidence of spillovers either within households or within Compassion
villages.
Table 8 presents estimates of the probability of completing secondary
school. Because the Compassion program typically sponsors children to
the end of secondary school, this is a natural level of school completion
TABLE 8
OLS and IV Estimates of Equations ð1Þ, ð20Þ, ð3Þ, and ð40Þ:
Secondary School Completion
Variable
OLS
ð1Þ
IV-GMM
ð2Þ
OLS-FE
ð3Þ
IV-GMM-FE
ð4Þ
Program participant ðtÞ .1324*** .1648* .1160*** .0624
ð.0275Þ ð.0937Þ ð.0172Þ ð.0846Þ
Compassion household:
ACI ≤ 12 ða1Þ 2.0266 2.0574 .0934* .1669***
ð.0523Þ ð.0582Þ ð.0553Þ ð.0638Þ
ACI 13–16 ða2Þ 2.0236 2.0495* 2.0060 .0219
ð.0385Þ ð.0267Þ ð.0339Þ ð.0238Þ
Program village:
ACI ≤ 12 ðb1Þ 2.0113 2.0092 .1126 .1655
ð.0589Þ ð.0387Þ ð.0751Þ ð.1094Þ
ACI 13–16 ðb2Þ 2.0324 2.0551 .0554 .0810
ð.0615Þ ð.0447Þ ð.0764Þ ð.0873Þ
Nonprogram village:
ACI ≤ 12 ðg1Þ 2.0219 2.0134 2.0323 2.0076
ð.0602Þ ð.0579Þ ð.0495Þ ð.0445Þ
ACI 13–16 ðg2Þ 2.0143 2.0082 2.0624* 2.0561*
ð.0449Þ ð.0432Þ ð.0309Þ ð.0294Þ
F-tests/x2 tests of parallel trends:
a2 5 b2 5 g2 .03 .83 1.37 6.56**
½.970 ½.660 ½.270 ½.038
a1 5 b1 5 g1 .04 .53 2.33 8.95**
½.962 ½.765 ½.114 ½.011
Intrahousehold spillovers:
ða1 2 a2Þ 2 ðg1 2 g2Þ .0046 2.0027 .0694 .0965
ð.0554Þ ð.0645Þ ð.421Þ ð.0603Þ
Intravillage spillovers:
ðb1 2 b2Þ 2 ðg1 2 g2Þ .0286 .0511 .0271 .0360
ð.0555Þ ð.0484Þ ð.0480Þ ð.0531Þ
Program impact including
intrahousehold spillovers:
t 1 ða12 a2Þ 2 ðg1 2 g2Þ .1371** .1621** .1854*** .1589***
ð.0581Þ ð.0642Þ ð.0425Þ ð.0503Þ
Hausman test ½p -value . . . ½.959 . . . ½.785
Overidentification ð J -testÞ ½p -value . . . 6.18 . . . 6.85
½.519 ½.444
Weak IV test ðF-statisticÞ . . . 60.03 . . . 48.93
Observations 9,954 9,954 9,954 9,954
R 2 .164 .161 .033 .019
Note.—Clustered standard errors at the village level are in parentheses. Each regression
includes controls for age at program introduction ðACIÞ at age 12 and below and at ages
13–16, age, age squared, birth order, gender, status as oldest child, mother’s education, fa-
ther’s education, mother’s education missing, and father’s education missing.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
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to examine. OLS estimates ðcol. 1Þ indicate that the direct effect of the
program ðtÞ raises the probability of completing secondary school by
13.2 percentage points. The IV estimates ðcol. 2Þ show a 16.5 percentage
point effect. Neither of these estimates shows significant spillover ef-
fects. Household fixed effects ðcols. 3 and 4Þ yield marginally significant
estimates of household spillovers onto other age-eligible siblings in sec-
ondary school completion, about 7 percentage points ðp -value 5 .109Þ
in the OLS estimates and about 10 percentage points ðp -value 5 .110Þ
in the IV estimates. ðAnother indication of spillovers is the rejection of
parallel trends for individuals with ACI ≤ 12; p -value 5 .011.Þ Incor-
porating these estimated spillovers increases the full program effect to
18.5 percentage points ðOLS-FEÞ and 15.9 percentage points ðIV-GMM-
FEÞ on sponsored individuals, both of which are highly significant. The
spillover point estimates, if valid, also indicate a 7–10 percentage point
impact on other age-eligible siblings.
Estimated impacts on completion of tertiary education are in table 9.
OLS estimates with and without household fixed effects in columns 1
and 3 yield statistically significant direct impacts ðtÞ of 2.4 and 2.1 per-
centage points, respectively. Given a baseline completion rate of 4.3 per-
cent, these point estimates, while small, reflect an approximate 50 percent
increase over this baseline. The IV point estimates in columns 2 and 4 are
somewhat larger but are of low statistical significance; moreover, Haus-
man tests cannot reject the consistency of the OLS estimates. Point esti-
mates of intrahousehold spillovers are small but positive, such that the
full impacts of the program ðincluding spilloversÞ range from 3.2 to
5.1 percentage points, each significant at the 5 percent level. But owing
to little direct evidence for household spillovers, we consider the more
conservative estimates ðon t onlyÞ to be the best estimates of program im-
pact. The IV-GMM estimate finds evidence of positive intravillage spill-
overs that is significant at the 5 percent level, but since this is the only
significant evidence of such spillovers out of 16 estimates in tables 6–9, it
could simply reflect random chance. ðAt the 5 percent significance level
one would expect one out of 20 estimates of a parameter that equals
zero to be significantly different from zero.Þ
Table 10 presents estimated direct impacts ðtÞ separately for each of
the six countries, focusing on the OLS and OLS with household fixed-
effects estimates.12 While the program impacts are positive and statisti-
cally significant in each country, a striking feature of these estimates is the
12 We omit country-specific IV estimates for space considerations and because Hausman
tests never reject the consistency of the OLS estimates ðwith and without household fixed
effectsÞ in the combined sample. Also, the GMM-IV results are generally much less precise
than the OLS estimates, and this imprecision is worsened by the small samples for each
country. Finally, GMM-IV estimation requires the number of instruments to be less than the
number of clusters ðvillagesÞ to obtain estimates of clustered standard errors. This is not an
issue for estimates that combine all six countries ðwhich have 32 villages and use eight
instrumentsÞ, but for the individual countries we have only four to seven villages.
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TABLE 9
OLS and IV Estimates of Equations ð1Þ, ð20Þ, ð3Þ, and ð40Þ: University Completion
Variable
OLS
ð1Þ
IV-GMM
ð2Þ
OLS-FE
ð3Þ
IV-GMM-FE
ð4Þ
Program participant ðtÞ .0243*** .0356* .0213** .0496
ð.0090Þ ð.0213Þ ð.0085Þ ð.0345Þ
Compassion household:
ACI ≤ 12 ða1Þ .0164 .0085 .0331* .0224
ð.0139Þ ð.0113Þ ð.0174Þ ð.0162Þ
ACI 13–16 ða2Þ .0094 .0038 .0150 .0137
ð.0117Þ ð.0099Þ ð.0129Þ ð.0123Þ
Program village:
ACI ≤ 12 ðb1Þ .0300* .0301** .0241 .0150
ð.0170Þ ð.0120Þ ð.0228Þ ð.0279Þ
ACI 13–16 ðb2Þ .0105 .0060 .0131 .0044
ð.0190Þ ð.0120Þ ð.0183Þ ð.0193Þ
Nonprogram village:
ACI ≤ 12 ðg1Þ 2.0036 2.0010 .0021 .0006
ð.0161Þ ð.0142Þ ð.0199Þ ð.0189Þ
ACI 13–16 ðg2Þ 2.0031 .0001 2.0069 2.0065
ð.0163Þ ð.0147Þ ð.0114Þ ð.0111Þ
F-tests/x2 tests of parallel trends:
a2 5 b2 5 g2 .24 .11 1.17 1.99
½.786 ½.948 ½.324 ½.370
a1 5 b1 5 g1 1.60 8.23** 1.07 .96
½.218 ½.016 ½.356 ½.619
Intrahousehold spillovers:
ða1 2 a2Þ 2 ðg1 2 g2Þ .0075 .0058 .0091 .0015
ð.0128Þ ð.0125Þ ð.0126Þ ð.0164Þ
Intravillage spillovers:
ðb1 2 b2Þ 2 ðg1 2 g2Þ .0200 .0252** .0020 .0035
ð.0145Þ ð.0119Þ ð.0206Þ ð.0207Þ
Program impact including
intrahousehold spillovers:
t 1 ða12 a2Þ 2 ðg1 2 g2Þ .0318** .0414** .0304** .0511**
ð.0137Þ ð.0178Þ ð.0149Þ ð.0247Þ
Hausman test ½p -value . . . ½.625 . . . ½.304
Overidentification ð J -testÞ ½p -value . . . 9.45 . . . 2.73
½.222 ½.909
Weak IV test ðF-statisticÞ . . . 60.03 . . . 48.93
Observations 9,954 9,954 9,954 9,954
R 2 .021 .020 .012 .006
Note.—Clustered standard errors at the village level are in parentheses. Each regression
includes controls for age at program introduction ðACIÞ at age 12 and below and at ages
13–16, age, age squared, birth order, gender, status as oldest child, mother’s education, fa-
ther’s education, mother’s education missing, and father’s education missing.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
variation across countries. The estimated impacts of sponsorship are
highest in Uganda: the OLS estimates are 2.47 more years of schooling,
a 10.6 percentage point increase in primary school completion, and 25.3
and 7.7 percentage point increases for secondary and university com-
pletion, respectively ðhousehold fixed-effect estimates are quite similarÞ.
The second-highest impacts aremost often found for Kenya, where point
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TABLE 10
OLS and OLS Household Fixed-Effect Estimates for Education by Country
Variable Uganda Guatemala Philippines India Kenya Bolivia
Total Years of Education
Program participant ðtÞ,
OLS 2.472*** .528*** .573*** .658** 1.156*** .668**
ð.236Þ ð.113Þ ð.064Þ ð.226Þ ð.142Þ ð.184Þ
R 2 .332 .426 .213 .246 .156 .307
Program participant ðtÞ,
household fixed effects 2.216*** .830*** .631*** .768** 1.312*** .733**
ð.232Þ ð.166Þ ð.008Þ ð.171Þ ð.141Þ ð.228Þ
R 2 .127 .147 .114 .062 .075 .128
Baseline, untreated 8.37 8.12 12.11 11.45 10.22 10.32
Primary Completion
Program participant ðtÞ,
OLS .1061** 2.0112* .0030 .0298* .0334* .0380
ð.0283Þ ð.0048Þ ð.0016Þ ð.0115Þ ð.0152Þ ð.0299Þ
R 2 .206 .329 .060 .093 .036 .231
Program participant ðtÞ,
household fixed effects .0966** .0270* .0054 .0293* .0517** .0491
ð.0339Þ ð.0116Þ ð.0028Þ ð.0128Þ ð.0162Þ ð.0313Þ
R 2 .076 .120 .009 .027 .014 .170
Baseline, untreated .795 .744 .993 .926 .948 .816
Secondary Completion
Program participant ðtÞ,
OLS .2532** .1403*** .1173*** .0833 .1218*** .0134
ð.0568Þ ð.0106Þ ð.0176Þ ð.0455Þ ð.0207Þ ð.0144Þ
R 2 .196 .293 .151 .195 .095 .204
Program participant ðtÞ,
household fixed effects .2176** .1320*** .1203*** .0869 .1154** .0259
ð.0580Þ ð.0206Þ ð.0026Þ ð.0464Þ ð.0345Þ ð.0235Þ
R 2 .075 .099 .060 .039 .037 .052
Baseline, untreated .192 .406 .732 .568 .314 .503
University Completion
Program participant ðtÞ,
OLS .0771** .0079 .0023 .0010 .0109 .0509*
ð.0188Þ ð.0207Þ ð.0089Þ ð.0290Þ ð.0106Þ ð.0245Þ
R 2 .107 .063 .024 .050 .058 .083
Program participant ðtÞ,
household fixed effects .0780*** .0205 .0071 2.0021 .0056 .0531*
ð.0154Þ ð.0111Þ ð.0088Þ ð.0242Þ ð.0052Þ ð.0218Þ
R 2 .037 .030 .045 .015 .015 .036
Baseline, untreated .055 .016 .020 .042 .037 .102
Observations 809 1,656 1,390 1,591 3,050 1,458
Note.—Clustered standard errors at the village level are in parentheses. Each regression
includes controls for age at program introduction ðACIÞ at age 12 and below and at ages
13–16, age, age squared, birth order, gender, status as oldest child, mother’s education, fa-
ther’s education, mother’s education missing, and father’s education missing.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
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estimates are 1.16 years for formal schooling, with impacts ðin percent-
age pointsÞ of 3.3 for primary completion, 12.2 for secondary comple-
tion, but no significant impact for university completion. Guatemala and
the Philippines have high estimated impacts for secondary school com-
pletion, at 14.0 and 11.7 percentage points, respectively. In Bolivia, nearly
all of the significant impact occurs at the university level, where spon-
sored individuals are 5.1 percentage points more likely to acquire a uni-
versity education. In India, impacts are smaller and are confined to the
lower levels of education. Overall the magnitude of educational impacts
across educational levels is much higher in the African countries than in
the Latin American and Asian countries. Thus, the impact of child spon-
sorship appears to be greatest where counterfactual levels of education
are lowest: Kenya and Uganda have the lowest rates of secondary school
completion and are second and third lowest in terms of years of com-
pleted schooling among the six countries in our data.
Table 11 shows estimated impacts on total years of formal schooling by
country and by gender, based on the OLS fixed-effect specification ðOLS
estimates without fixed effects are very similarÞ. The most striking fea-
ture of these results is that the impacts are generally larger for the gen-
der with the lowest baseline education levels. In particular, in the Phil-
TABLE 11
OLS Fixed-Effect Estimates for Total Years of Schooling
by Country and Gender
Variable Uganda Guatemala Philippines India Kenya Bolivia
Boys
Program
participant ðtÞ 1.463** .496 .706*** .671** 1.486*** .481***
ð.518Þ ð.361Þ ð.041Þ ð.229Þ ð.189Þ ð.104Þ
Observations 385 848 697 795 1,569 730
R 2 .169 .141 .071 .064 .069 .134
Baseline,
untreated
8.39 8.48 11.86 11.24 10.29 10.55
Girls
Program
participant ðtÞ 2.735*** 1.190*** .395*** .423 .935*** .695
ð.405Þ ð.173Þ ð.053Þ ð.328Þ ð.124Þ ð.517Þ
Observations 424 808 693 796 1,481 728
R 2 .163 .214 .154 .110 .081 .165
Baseline,
untreated 8.35 7.74 12.37 11.66 10.14 10.08
Note.—Estimations include fixed effects at the household level. Clustered standard
errors at the village level are in parentheses. Each regression includes controls for age at
program introduction ðACIÞ at age 12 and below and at ages 13–16, age, age squared, birth
order, gender, and status as oldest child.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
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ippines and India, where baseline schooling is higher for girls among
nonsponsored children, the impact of sponsorship is higher for boys.
Similarly, in Uganda, Guatemala, and Bolivia, where baseline schooling
is higher for boys among nonsponsored children, point estimates of pro-
gram impact are higher for girls.
B. Impacts on Employment and Leadership
Along with educational goals, two other major objectives of the Com-
passion program are to prepare sponsored children for employment and
community leadership. We briefly discuss program impacts on these out-
comes; the estimates are given in the Appendix. Two employment out-
comes are considered: ð1Þ the probability of formal employment, defined
as “currently employed at a steady salary,” which rules out itinerant la-
borer work; and ð2Þ the probability of “white-collar” employment.13 Ta-
ble A1 presents basic descriptive statistics for the employment and lead-
ership variables. OLS ðOLS with fixed effectsÞ estimates in table A2
show a significant direct impact ðtÞ of 5.1 ð6.3Þ percentage points over
a 35.9 percent baseline level of formal employment. The IV-GMM esti-
mates of t are much larger, but the full impact estimates that adjust for
negative spillovers ðwhich may reflect an inelastic supply of salaried jobs
in the local communityÞ are closer to the OLS and OLS-FE estimates.
OLS estimates for white-collar employment in table A3 show impacts of
6.5 and 6.7 percentage points over a baseline of 18.7 percent. Multino-
mial logit estimates of program impacts on movement into the different
job categories in table A4 show that the increase in white-collar work is
not from a large movement into high-paying jobs; it primarily consists
of movement toward relatively modestly paid white-collar work, particu-
larly teaching. With a 3.4 percentage point marginal effect and a base-
line level of 5.4 percent, Compassion sponsorship increases the proba-
bility that a child becomes a teacher by 63 percent. The reason may be
that many Compassion children are from families with little exposure to
white-collar work, so that teachers may serve as primary role models. In-
dividual country estimations in table A7 show that employment impacts
tend to be highest in countries where economic growth is higher, spe-
cifically in the Philippines, India, and Guatemala.
A third Compassion goal is to develop leadership skills. OLS and fixed-
effects OLS estimates yield impacts of 2.2 to 0.9 percentage points, re-
spectively, on the probability of being a community leader in adulthood
13 We divided occupations into 14 types: ð1Þ agriculture, ð2Þ construction, ð3Þ clerical/
sales, ð4Þ blue-collar work, ð5Þ personal services, ð6Þ teaching, ð7Þ public administration,
ð8Þ small business, ð9Þ pastoral/religious ministry, ð10Þ finance/large business, ð11Þ police/
army/security, ð12Þ professional ðdoctors, lawyers, engineers, etc.Þ, ð13Þ less skilled tech-
nical work ðe.g., call centersÞ, and ð14Þ nursing/public health. A “white-collar” job is de-
fined as categories 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, and 12–14.
424 journal of political economy
This content downloaded from 138.202.189.84 on Wed, 3 Dec 2014 16:21:43 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
over a baseline of 2.9 percent, but IV estimations are near zero or even
negative ðtable A5Þ. OLS and OLS with fixed-effects estimates ðtable A6Þ
yield 6.0 and 3.5 percentage point increases, respectively, on the proba-
bility of becoming a church leader over an 8.7 percent baseline, while
IV estimations are negative and imprecisely estimated.
C. Robustness Checks
We conducted a number of robustness checks on these results. Estimates
that limit the sample to those over age 25 yield similar point estimates
and significance for the education ðand employmentÞ outcomes. We also
tried several different sets of instruments, interacting our instrumental
variables with three other variables to obtainACI group SORR gender,
ACI group  SORR  age, and ACI group  SORR  birth order. Some
of these instruments offered higher first-stage F-statistics, others slightly
lower. Results from using different instruments yield nearly identical esti-
mates for the educational outcomes. Some instrument sets yielded slightly
larger and more significant impacts on employment and leadership out-
comes, while others were slightly weaker. Overall, our chosen instrument
set is in about the middle of all the instrument sets we tried in terms of
both first- and second-stage significance, and thus it provides reasonably
stable estimates of the impact of the Compassion program.
A third robustness check verified that the estimated impacts do not re-
flect negative spillovers onto older siblings. Estimates for the education
ðand employmentÞ variables on sponsored children who had no older
siblings yield coefficients that are generally similar to those provided
here. We also considered the possibility of reporting bias that favored
the program. To avoid this bias, the enumerators hadno formal ties to the
sponsorship program. We also find no evidence of reporting bias; sep-
arate regressions for each type of principal respondent ðparent, spon-
sored child, sibling, etc.Þ yield essentially no differences in point esti-
mates or significance of estimated impacts. Finally, although we found
93.5 percent of the families of the formerly sponsored children, could
the results be significantly different for the 6.5 percent whom we were
unable to locate? This is unlikely since the strongest results are for the
two African countries, where we located 99 percent of the formerly spon-
sored children’s families.
VI. Conclusion
We estimate that the Compassion child sponsorship program increases
years of completed schooling by 1.03–1.46 years over a baseline of
10.19 years and increases the probability of primary school completion
by 4.0–7.7 percentage points ðbaseline 88.7 percentÞ, secondary school
completion by 11.6–16.5 percentage points ðbaseline 44.9 percentÞ, and
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university completion by 2.1–2.4 percentage points ðbaseline 4.3 per-
centÞ. We also find impacts of 5.1–6.3 percentage points on the proba-
bility of salaried employment in adulthood and a 6.5–6.7 percentage
point increase in the probability of white-collar employment, as well as
modest evidence for causal impacts on community and church leader-
ship.
One can compare these estimated impacts of Compassion’s child spon-
sorship program on education outcomes to recent estimates for other ed-
ucational interventions. For example, Aaronson and Mazumder ð2011Þ
examine the introduction of Rosenwald schools from 1913 to 1931 to fos-
ter the education among rural blacks in the US South. They conclude
that the introduction of these schools increased secondary school com-
pletion among rural blacks by 8.3 percentage points and increased for-
mal schoolingoutcomesby 1.2 years, estimates that are strikingly similar to
ours. Our results for the Compassion program compare favorably to the
0.66-year increase in years of schooling found by Schultz ð2004Þ on the
PROGRESA/Oportunidades CCT program in Mexico and the 0.12–0.19
increase in years of schooling that Duflo ð2001Þ estimates as the impact
of the large school construction program in Indonesia; she also estimates
a 6 percentage point increase in primary school completion, an estimate
similar to ours, but finds a slightly negative impact on secondary comple-
tion.
We conclude by discussing a possible causal mechanism behind these
impacts that subsequent work has begun to explore. The most salient
characteristic that distinguishes Compassion’s program from compara-
ble interventions is its emphasis on raising children’s self-esteem, ref-
erence points, and aspirations. As such, it aims to simultaneously relieve
both internal and external constraints that can impede progress in ed-
ucation.14 Indeed, the role of psychological factors has gained increasing
attention in development economics.15 Recent research has explored the
role of psychological factors on credit decisions ðBertrand et al. 2010Þ,
health ðDupas 2010Þ, technology adoption ðDuflo, Kremer, and Rob-
inson 2011Þ, and education ðKremer et al. 2009Þ.
Three follow-up studies conducted in Bolivia, Kenya, and Indonesia
investigate whether adult life outcomes may have been shaped by the
Compassion program’s focus on developing self-esteem and nurturing
aspirations during childhood. Unlike this paper, which examines for-
14 Dalton et al. ð2010Þ provide an excellent theoretical treatment of internalized poverty
constraints.
15 Mullainathan ð2006Þ and Bernard et al. ð2011Þ review the role of psychology in de-
velopment economics.
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merly sponsored subjects who are now adults, these three follow-up stud-
ies focus on currently sponsored children.
Ross ð2010Þ examines the life aspirations of 270 children living near
Compassion sponsorship projects in Bolivia. In response to the question,
“What level of education would you say is sufficient for one to be suc-
cessful today?” sponsored children’s answers yield village fixed-effect
estimates averaging 0.89 year higher than unsponsored children ðaver-
age p < .05Þ, a figure just under the estimated impact on years of school-
ing found in this paper. Sponsored children also appear to have higher
self-expectations for future vocations. When asked “What occupation
do you realistically expect to have in the future?” sponsored children were
10.1–25.3 percentage points more likely than unsponsored children to
respond with a white-collar occupation ðaverage p < .10Þ.
In a second follow-up study, Ross and Wydick ð2011Þ surveyed 570
children aged 10–18 in three villages in Kenya, using an IV strategy that
exploits the same age eligibility and limited children per family spon-
sorship rules used in this paper. Estimates indicate that sponsorship
raises educational expectations by 0.23 standard deviations of the dis-
tribution of those expectations ðp < .10Þ, as well as raising the proba-
bility that a child expects to have a white-collar job by 12.5 percentage
points. These changes in expectations about future education and vo-
cation are similar to the estimated impacts among the adults found in
this paper.
A third follow-up study, Glewwe and Wydick ð2013Þ, examines data
from 540 poor children in the slums of Jakarta, Indonesia, finding im-
pacts on schooling aspirations from sponsorship that parallel the find-
ings of the previous two studies. In addition, a new box of 24 colored
pencils was placed in front of each child, who was then asked to “draw
a picture of yourself in the rain.” Using factor analysis with a varimax
rotation on 20 dummy variables that relate drawing characteristics to five
measures of hopefulness and self-esteem, we were able to identify three
latent factors: happiness, self-efficacy, and hopelessness.16 Regressions
controlling for age, gender, family selection, and neighborhood reveal a
0.27 standard deviation increase in happiness among the Compassion-
sponsored children ðt5 2.40Þ, a 0.33 standard deviation increase in self-
efficacy ðt 5 3.11Þ, and a 0.52 standard deviation decrease in hopeless-
ness ðt 5 5.19Þ.
16 There is a large literature on interpreting children’s drawings to gauge their psy-
chological well-being ðKoppitz 1968; Klepsch and Logie 1982; Furth 2002Þ. Researchers
have found empirical correlations between aspects of children’s human figure drawings to
a variety of professionally diagnosed disorders, including anxiety and emotional insecurity
ðmissing mouth, frowning, use of dark colorsÞ, low self-esteem ðtiny figure, poor integra-
tion of body parts, missing arms or handsÞ, and low self-efficacy ðtiny head, short armsÞ.
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While further work is required to establish a causal link between as-
pirations and adult life outcomes, the possibility that nurturing aspira-
tions can have important effects on economic development has intrigu-
ing implications. Traditionally, development economics—and indeed
the practice of economic development—has focused on the relief of
external constraints such as school quality, infrastructure, and credit.
But it may be that the internal constraints of the poor also contribute to
poverty traps in important ways. Further observational and experimental
research should seek to better understand the internal constraints faced
by the poor and how development efforts that seek to release internal
constraints can complement purely economic interventions and incen-
tives.
Appendix
TABLE A1
Summary Means and t -Tests of Employment and Leadership Variables
Mean,
Sponsored
Individuals
ð1Þ
Mean, All
Nonsponsored
Individuals
ð2Þ
Difference
t -Test
ð3Þ
Mean, Non-
sponsored
Siblings in
Sponsored
Households
ð4Þ
Difference
t -Test
ð5Þ
Formally employed .423 .359 .064*** .341 .082***
ð.494Þ ð.480Þ ð.013Þ ð.474Þ ð.014Þ
White-collar employed .274 .187 .086*** .180 .094***
ð.446Þ ð.390Þ ð.011Þ ð.384Þ ð.012Þ
Community leader .046 .029 .017*** .026 .020***
ð.209Þ ð.168Þ ð.0047Þ ð.159Þ ð.005Þ
Church leader .161 .087 .073*** .095 .065***
ð.367Þ ð.282Þ ð.0079Þ ð.293Þ ð.0094Þ
Note.—In cols. 1, 2, and 4, numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. In cols. 3
and 5, numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Full sample size is 10,144. Number of
formerly sponsored individuals is 1,860. Number of individuals in nontreated households
is 4,580. Number of nonsponsored individuals in treated households is 3,704.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
428 journal of political economy
This content downloaded from 138.202.189.84 on Wed, 3 Dec 2014 16:21:43 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
TABLE A2
OLS and IV Estimates of Equations ð1Þ, ð20Þ, ð3Þ, and ð40Þ: Formal Employment
Variable
OLS
ð1Þ
IV-GMM
ð2Þ
OLS-FE
ð3Þ
IV-GMM-FE
ð4Þ
Program participant ðtÞ .0505* .1869*** .0628*** .2888***
ð.0264Þ ð.0667Þ ð.0148Þ ð.0712Þ
Compassion household:
ACI ≤ 12 ða1Þ .1399 .0405 .1149*** .0009
ð.0887Þ ð.0698Þ ð.0387Þ ð.0451Þ
ACI 13–16 ða2Þ .0425 .0434 .0458 .0368
ð.0542Þ ð.0406Þ ð.0313Þ ð.0230Þ
Program village:
ACI ≤ 12 ðb1Þ .1197 .0822 .1517*** .1521***
ð.0992Þ ð.0621Þ ð.0412Þ ð.0368Þ
ACI 13–16 ðb2Þ .1021 .0859** .1078** .1230***
ð.0688Þ ð.0427Þ ð.0466Þ ð.0387Þ
Nonprogram village:
ACI ≤ 12 ðg1Þ 2.0169 2.0385 .0867 .0889
ð.1002Þ ð.0710Þ ð.0646Þ ð.0608Þ
ACI 13–16 ðg2Þ 2.1111* 2.1235*** 2.0261 2.0208
ð.0582Þ ð.0421Þ ð.0497Þ ð.0481Þ
F-tests/x2 tests of parallel trends:
a2 5 b2 5 g2 9.23*** 23.06*** 2.40 7.05**
½.001 ½.000 ½.108 ½.030
a1 5 b1 5 g1 3.02* 2.91 .66 11.89***
½.063 ½.234 ½.522 .003
Intrahousehold spillovers:
ða1 2 a2Þ 2 ðg1 2 g2Þ .0033 2.0879* 2.0436 2.1456***
ð.0458Þ ð.0477Þ ð.0370Þ ð.0480Þ
Intravillage spillovers:
ðb1 2 b2Þ 2 ðg1 2 g2Þ 2.0765 2.0886* 2.0688 2.0807**
ð.0583Þ ð.0463Þ ð.0466Þ ð.0381Þ
Program impact including
intrahousehold spillovers:
t 1 ða1 2 a2Þ 2 ðg1 2 g2Þ .0538 .0990* .0192 .1431***
ð.0545Þ ð.0557Þ ð.0384Þ ð.0467Þ
Hausman test ½p -value . . . ½.255 . . . ½.073
Overidentification ð J -testÞ ½p -value . . . 3.19 . . . 7.86
½.867 ½.447
Weak IV test ðF-statisticÞ . . . 75.31 . . . 50.09
Observations 9,497 9,497 9,497 9,497
R 2 .124 .115 .073 .036
Note.—Clustered standard errors at the village level are in parentheses. Each regression
includes controls for age at program introduction ðACIÞ at age 12 and below and at ages
13–16, age, age squared, birth order, gender, status as oldest child, mother’s education, fa-
ther’s education, mother’s education missing, and father’s education missing.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
This content downloaded from 138.202.189.84 on Wed, 3 Dec 2014 16:21:43 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
TABLE A3
OLS and IV Estimates of ð1Þ, ð20Þ, ð3Þ, and ð40Þ: White-Collar Employment
Variable
OLS
ð1Þ
IV-GMM
ð2Þ
OLS-FE
ð3Þ
IV-GMM-FE
ð4Þ
Program participant ðtÞ .0654*** .0638 .0665*** .0891*
ð.0224Þ ð.0571Þ ð.0157Þ ð.0509Þ
Compassion household:
ACI ≤ 12 ða1Þ .0525 .0657 .0837*** .0870**
ð.0394Þ ð.0438Þ ð.0301Þ ð.0384Þ
ACI 13–16 ða2Þ .0113 .0097 .0197 .0201
ð.0283Þ ð.0203Þ ð.0223Þ ð.0182Þ
Program village:
ACI ≤ 12 ðb1Þ .1098** .1408*** .1167** .1252***
ð.0487Þ ð.0300Þ ð.0447Þ ð.0329Þ
ACI 13–16 ðb2Þ .0949** .0797** .1161** .1180***
ð.0420Þ ð.0336Þ ð.0568Þ ð.0460Þ
Nonprogram village:
ACI ≤ 12 ðg1Þ .0167 .0633 .0694 .0931**
ð.0591Þ ð.0457Þ ð.0452Þ ð.0423Þ
ACI 13–16 ðg2Þ 2.0204 .0165 .0017 .0311
ð.0496Þ ð.0423Þ ð.0414Þ ð.0392Þ
F-tests/x2 tests of parallel trends:
a2 5 b2 5 g2 1.77 2.69 1.71 5.09*
½.188 ½.261 ½.197 ½.078
a1 5 b1 5 g1 2.87* 7.29** .43 .89
½.072 ½.026 ½.657 ½.640
Intrahousehold spillovers:
ða1 2 a2Þ 2 ðg1 2 g2Þ .0041 .0092 2.0037 .0050
ð.0316Þ ð.0374Þ ð.0230Þ ð.0362Þ
Intravillage spillovers:
ðb1 2 b2Þ 2 ðg1 2 g2Þ 2.0221 .0143 2.0670 2.0547*
ð.0503Þ ð.0420Þ ð.0418Þ ð.0301Þ
Program impact including
intrahousehold spillovers:
t 1 ða1 2 a2Þ 2 ðg1 2 g2Þ .0695* .0730* .0627** .0941***
ð.0360Þ ð.0439Þ ð.0267Þ ð.0276Þ
Hausman test ½p -value . . . ½.688 . . . ½.664
Overidentification ð J -testÞ ½p -value . . . 9.90 . . . 12.61
½.195 ½.126
Weak IV test ðF-statisticÞ . . . 68.56 . . . 41.08
Observations 9,596 9,596 9,596 9,596
R 2 .091 .089 .027 .026
Note.—Clustered standard errors at the village level are in parentheses. Each regression
includes controls for age at program introduction ðACIÞ at age 12 and below and at ages
13–16, age, age squared, birth order, gender, status as oldest child, mother’s education, fa-
ther’s education, mother’s education missing, and father’s education missing.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
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TABLE A4
Impacts on Vocation: Marginal Effects, Multinomial Logit Estimates
Six Countries
Occupational Category
Multinomial Logit
Coefficients
Marginal
Effects
Mean
Untreated
1. Agriculture .532** .0164 .051
ð.217Þ ð.0147Þ
2. Construction, day labor 1.085*** .0147* .024
ð.406Þ ð.0088Þ
3. Clerical, sales .623** .0232 .050
ð.250Þ ð.0142Þ
4. Blue-collar .457** .0141 .069
ð.198Þ ð.0110Þ
5. Personal services .314 .0034 .052
ð.209Þ ð.0106Þ
6. Teaching .808*** .0341*** .054
ð.160Þ ð.0120Þ
7. Government .897* .0059 .007
ð.509Þ ð.0048Þ
8. Small business .032 2.0096 .049
ð.144Þ ð.0077Þ
9. Ministry, pastoral .567 .0023 .007
ð.444Þ ð.0032Þ
10. Finance and large business .574** .0106 .029
ð.268Þ ð.0083Þ
11. Police, army, security, fire .963*** .0084** .011
ð.307Þ ð.0040Þ
12. Professional, doctor, lawyer 2.078 2.0052 .019
ð.353Þ ð.0049Þ
13. Less skilled technical, call centers .636** .0086 .020
ð.294Þ ð.0067Þ
14. Nursing, public health, hospital .505 .0026 .011
ð.322Þ ð.0032Þ
Note.—Clustered standard errors at the village level are in parentheses. Marginal ef-
fects, dy=dx, are from corresponding multinomial logit estimates; control variables are
gender, age, age squared, birth order, oldest child, and a dummy variable for household
with sponsored child. The base category is unemployment. Number of observations is
8,911; pseudo R 2 5 .0470; x2 p < .0001.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
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TABLE A5
OLS and IV Estimates of Equations ð1Þ, ð20Þ, ð3Þ, and ð40Þ: Community Leader
Variable
OLS
ð1Þ
IV-GMM
ð2Þ
OLS-FE
ð3Þ
IV-GMM-FE
ð4Þ
Program participant ðtÞ .0218*** .0007 .0093** 2.0461***
ð.0063Þ ð.0149Þ ð.0041Þ ð.0133Þ
Compassion household:
ACI ≤ 12 ða1Þ .0373* .0501*** .0351** .0623***
ð.0214Þ ð.0185Þ ð.0169Þ ð.0157Þ
ACI 13–16 ða2Þ .0226 .0327*** .0230 .0210***
ð.0155Þ ð.0103Þ ð.0146Þ ð.0076Þ
Program village:
ACI ≤ 12 ðb1Þ .0534* .0577** .0413** .0419***
ð.0292Þ ð.0247Þ ð.0171Þ ð.0121Þ
ACI 13–16 ðb2Þ .0567** .0736*** .0493** .0474***
ð.0268Þ ð.0239Þ ð.0192Þ ð.0121Þ
Nonprogram village:
ACI ≤ 12 ðg1Þ 2.0147 2.0138 .0121 .0120
ð.0430Þ ð.0411Þ ð.0201Þ ð.0186Þ
ACI 13–16 ðg2Þ 2.0306 2.0323 .0117 .0104
ð.0353Þ ð.0337Þ ð.0237Þ ð.0216Þ
F-tests/x2 tests of parallel trends:
a2 5 b2 5 g2 2.36 8.32** 1.24 7.91**
½.111 ½.016 ½.304 ½.019
a1 5 b1 5 g1 1.39 3.28 .94 6.42**
½.263 ½.194 ½.401 ½.040
Intrahousehold spillovers:
ða1 2 a2Þ 2 ðg1 2 g2Þ 2.0012 2.0011 .0118 .0397**
ð.0155Þ ð.0156Þ ð.0197Þ ð.0186Þ
Intravillage spillovers:
ðb1 2 b2Þ 2 ðg1 2 g2Þ 2.0191 2.0343* 2.0083 2.0071
ð.0242Þ ð.0179Þ ð.0259Þ ð.0162Þ
Program impact including
intrahousehold spillovers:
t 1 ða1 2 a2Þ 2 ðg1 2 g2Þ .0206 2.0004 .0212 2.0065
ð.0157Þ ð.0146Þ ð.0197Þ ð.0158Þ
Hausman test ½ p -value . . . .493 . . . .091
Overidentification ð J -testÞ ½ p -value . . . 10.84 . . . 3.03
½.146 ½.933
Weak IV test ðF-statisticÞ . . . 61.79 . . . 40.87
Observations 9,495 9,495 9,495 9,495
R 2 .017 .015 .018 .002
Note.—Clustered standard errors at the village level are in parentheses. Each regression
includes controls for age at program introduction ðACIÞ at age 12 and below and at ages
13–16, age, age squared, birth order, gender, status as oldest child, mother’s education, fa-
ther’s education, mother’s education missing, and father’s education missing.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
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TABLE A6
OLS and IV Estimates of Equations ð1Þ, ð20Þ, ð3Þ, and ð40Þ: Church Leader
Variable
OLS
ð1Þ
IV-GMM
ð2Þ
OLS-FE
ð3Þ
IV-GMM-FE
ð4Þ
Program participant ðtÞ .0603*** 2.0642* .0352*** 2.0715
ð.0142Þ ð.0374Þ ð.0113Þ ð.0452Þ
Compassion household:
ACI ≤ 12 ða1Þ 2.0453 2.0109 2.0076 .0443
ð.0338Þ ð.0198Þ ð.0238Þ ð.0322Þ
ACI 13–16 ða2Þ 2.0384* 2.0508*** 2.0113 2.0155
ð.0223Þ ð.0119Þ ð.0198Þ ð.0152Þ
Program village:
ACI ≤ 12 ðb1Þ 2.0548 2.0829* 2.0271 2.0148
ð.0764Þ ð.0427Þ ð.0514Þ ð.0377Þ
ACI 13–16 ðb2Þ 2.0148 2.0407* .0327 .0088
ð.0418Þ ð.0232Þ ð.0321Þ ð.0256Þ
Nonprogram village:
ACI ≤ 12 ðg1Þ 2.0501 2.0680* 2.0352 2.0219
ð.0463Þ ð.0368Þ ð.0248Þ ð.0244Þ
ACI 13–16 ðg2Þ 2.0522 2.0669** 2.0213 2.0171
ð.0405Þ ð.0341Þ ð.0212Þ ð.0208Þ
F-tests/x2 tests of parallel trends:
a2 5 b2 5 g2 .44 .51 1.49 1.05
½.645 ½.776 ½.241 ½.592
a1 5 b1 5 g1 .02 7.57** .77 3.97
½.980 ½.023 ½.470 ½.137
Intrahousehold spillovers:
ða1 2 a2Þ 2 ðg1 2 g2Þ 2.0090 .0410* .0176 .0647**
ð.0260Þ ð.0242Þ ð.0175Þ ð.0303Þ
Intravillage spillovers:
ðb1 2 b2Þ 2 ðg1 2 g2Þ 2.0421 2.0411 2.0459 2.0187
ð.0420Þ ð.0333Þ ð.0321Þ ð.0219Þ
Program impact including
intrahousehold spillovers:
t 1 ða1 2 a2Þ 2 ðg1 2 g2Þ .0513* 2.0231 .0528*** 2.0068
ð.0266Þ ð.0275Þ ð.0191Þ ð.0239Þ
Hausman test ½p -value . . . ½.007 . . . ½.144
Overidentification ð J -testÞ ½p -value . . . 4.59 . . . 9.31
½.710 ½.317
Weak IV test ðF-statisticÞ . . . 63.46 . . . 40.18
Observations 9,468 9,468 9,468 9,468
R 2 .018 .001 .005 .056
Note.—Clustered standard errors at the village level are in parentheses. Each regression
includes controls for age at program introduction ðACIÞ at age 12 and below and at ages
13–16, age, age squared, birth order, gender, status as oldest child, mother’s education, fa-
ther’s education, mother’s education missing, and father’s education missing.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
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TABLE A7
OLS and OLS Fixed-Effect Estimates for Employment
and Leadership by Country
Variable Uganda Guatemala Philippines India Kenya Bolivia
Employed with Salary
Program participant ðtÞ .048 .133** .089*** .143** .039** .025
ð.031Þ ð.045Þ ð.011Þ ð.040Þ ð.015Þ ð.040Þ
R 2 .192 .137 .136 .313 .049 .134
Program participant ðtÞ,
household fixed effects .042 .081 .086*** .145** .047** .017
ð.025Þ ð.063Þ ð.014Þ ð.037Þ ð.018Þ ð.039Þ
R 2 .157 .091 .101 .319 .029 .085
Observations 798 1,503 1,341 1,552 2,942 1,361
Baseline, untreated .544 .281 .425 .646 .136 .353
White-Collar Employment
Program participant ðtÞ .099 .113*** .139*** .065*** .027*** .047
ð.055Þ ð.004Þ ð.020Þ ð.008Þ ð.004Þ ð.038Þ
R 2 .104 .160 .093 .074 .048 .065
Program participant ðtÞ,
household fixed effects .095 .122*** .128*** .068** .025** .038
ð.052Þ ð.011Þ ð.014Þ ð.015Þ ð.009Þ ð.034Þ
R 2 .066 .104 .062 .039 .018 .041
Observations 809 1,506 1,376 1,591 2,942 1,372
Baseline, untreated .184 .182 .298 .362 .056 .149
Community Leader
Program participant ðtÞ .035 .035 .024*** .016 .0070* .023*
ð.029Þ ð.023Þ ð.004Þ ð.008Þ ð.0035Þ ð.010Þ
R 2 .101 .036 .026 .037 .019 .072
Program participant ðtÞ,
household fixed effects .043* .009 2.0048* .005 .001 .021
ð.018Þ ð.009Þ ð.0020Þ ð.003Þ ð.008Þ ð.011Þ
R 2 .091 .011 .013 .018 .017 .049
Observations 793 1,487 1,359 1,543 2,942 1,371
Baseline, untreated .085 .016 .019 .021 .016 .057
Church Leader
Program participant ðtÞ .169*** .054 .076 2.020 .063** .027
ð.032Þ ð.040Þ ð.038Þ ð.012Þ ð.020Þ ð.028Þ
R 2 .080 .071 .054 .036 .021 .037
Program participant ðtÞ,
household fixed effects .112* .015 .048** .001 .038** .011
ð.052Þ ð.050Þ ð.015Þ ð.014Þ ð.015Þ ð.036Þ
R 2 .040 .024 .024 .011 .009 .014
Observations 773 1,491 1,354 1,542 2,942 1,366
Baseline, untreated .119 .138 .086 .097 .061 .062
Note.—Clustered standard errors at the village level are in parentheses. Each regression
includes controls for age at program introduction ðACIÞ at age 12 and below and at ages
13–16, age, age squared, birth order, gender, status as oldest child, number of siblings,
mother’s and father’s education, mother’s education missing, and father’s education miss-
ing. Fixed effects are at the household level.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
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